know

The “Flesch Index”, this is an objective method of measuring the readability of English text. This index measures the level of understanding necessary for someone to comprehend the written English language. The average newspaper is written at a Flesch index of 7. The average high school graduate reads and understands at a level of 10. The average law school grad reads and understands at a level of 15. The Internal Revenue Code ranks a 31, with some specific provisions as high as an astounding 55. To further confuse the issue, the words used in law have specific legal definitions that are very different from the common English definitions.

If the laws that we are to obey, are written at a level that an individual of average intelligence cannot understand, then perhaps we have reason to be suspect of the writers' motives. The IRS code is at 31, people in this country cannot understand at this level, this is more than twice the level of a law school graduate! What that means is that even when you hire a lawyer, he will have trouble interpreting what it means. The real danger here is, people who are considered “experts” on a subject that is beyond your comprehension can mislead and bamboozle you at will!. How many people have the time, energy, and ability to go into a law library and piece this puzzle together?    It seems that by making the law so difficult to read, the State Legislature and Congress has effectively removed our access to it.

The Legislature is presumed to know existing law when it enacts a new statute, including the existing state of the common law. (See, e.g., Keeler v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 619 , 625 [87 Cal.Rptr. 481, 470 P.2d 617, 40 A.L.R.3d 420] ["It will be presumed, of course, that in enacting a statute the Legislature was familiar with the relevant rules of the common law."]; People v. Welch (1971) 20 Cal.App.3d 997, 1002 [98 Cal.Rptr. 113] ["It also [67 Cal.App.4th 1501] may be assumed that the 1951 amendments were enacted by a Legislature familiar with its previous acts, existing judicial decisions construing the same, and the common law rules."]; Schmidt v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 23 , 27 [17 Cal.Rptr.2d 340] ["[I]t is assumed that the Legislature has existing laws in mind at the time that it enacts a new statute. (Estate of McDill (1975) 14 Cal.3d 831 , 837 [122 Cal.Rptr. 754, 537 P.2d 874].)"].)
Arthur Andersen v. Superior Court (Quackenbush) (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1481 , 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 879
[No. B118547. Second Dist., Div. Two. Nov 24, 1998.]

Persons dealing with a public agency are presumed to know the law and are bound at their peril to ascertain and follow those procedures necessary to enter into a binding contract. (See Miller v. McKinnon, supra, 20 Cal.2d at p. 89; Bear River etc. Corp. v. County of Placer (1953) 118 Cal.App.2d 684 , 690 [258 P.2d 543].)
SEYMOUR v. STATE OF CALIFORNIA, 156 Cal.App.3d 200
[Civ. No. 22606. Court of Appeals of California, Third Appellate District. March 9, 1984.]

In Pisani v. Martini (1933) 132 Cal.App. 269, 274 [217 Cal.App.2d 231] [22 P.2d 804], the court stated: "It [the jury] is not presumed to know the law, and if in the absence of instructions it assumes to possess such knowledge, any attempt to apply it to the facts of the case constitutes a violation of its duty."
Smith v. Wemmer , 217 Cal.App.2d 226
[Civ. No. 20817. First Dist., Div. Two. June 17, 1963.]

"Everyone is presumed to know the law.   And all applicable laws in existence when an agreement is made necessarily enter into it and form a part of it as fully as if they were expressly referred to and incorporated in its terms." (6 Cal.Jur. 310, § 186; Brown v. Ferdon, 5 Cal.2d 226 [54 P.2d 712]; Chapman v. Jocelyn, 182 Cal. 294 [187 P. 962]; Long v. Newman, 10 Cal.App. 430 [102 P. 534].)

The contracting parties were, therefore, presumed to know all existing laws...
Robertson v. Dodson, 54 Cal.App.2d 661
[Civ. No. 12069. First Dist., Div. One. Oct. 2, 1942.]

It may be that citizens must be presumed to know the law. (See 1 Witkin, Cal. Crimes (1963) § 148, p. 141.)
People v. Carr (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 774 , 251 Cal.Rptr. 458
[No. D005459. Court of Appeals of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division One. September 16, 1988.]

...the trial court apparently concluded that a police officer is presumed to know the law relative to the proper procedures to be followed in effecting a lawful eviction.   Even if we assume that a police officer is presumed to know the law relative to the eviction of tenants for nonpayment of rent,...
People v. Superior Court (1970) 3 Cal.App.3d 648 , 83 Cal.Rptr. 732
[Civ. No. 34858. Court of Appeals of California, Second Appellate District, Division Two. January 20, 1970.]

...all persons are presumed to know the law including that which prohibits causing injury or death to another.
People v. Maynarich, 83 Cal.App.3d 476
[Crim. No. 31052. Second Dist., Div. Five. July 31, 1978.]

...for all persons are presumed to know the law including that which prohibits causing injury or death to another.

The court in Poddar noted (p. 758): "The effect, ... which a diminished capacity bears on malice in a second degree murder-implied malice case is relevant to two questions: First, was the accused because of a diminished capacity unaware of a duty to act within the law? A person is, of course, presumed to know the law which prohibits injuring another. Second, even assuming that the accused was aware of this duty to act within the law, was he, because of a diminished capacity, unable to act in accordance with that duty? [Citations; fn. omitted.] If it is established that an accused, because he suffered a diminished capacity, was unaware of or unable to act in accordance with the law, malice could not properly be found and the maximum offense for which he could be convicted would be voluntary manslaughter." Thus malice as the Poddar court noted is to be properly implied when the killing resulted from an accident involving a high degree of probability of death and is accompanied by the requisite mental element. (Id, at p. 759.) Poddar fashioned that three-pronged inquiry as the proper procedure requisite to a finding of malice aforethought. "First, was the act or acts done for a base, antisocial purpose? Second, was the accused aware of the duty imposed upon him not to commit acts which involve the risk of grave injury or death? Third, if so, did he act despite that awareness? The first determination is expressly required in accordance with the definition of implied malice, and the second and third determinations are required relative to the question of 'wanton disregard' also in accordance with the definition of implied malice." (Id, at pp. 759-760.)
PEOPLE v. ODOM, 108 Cal.App.3d 100
[Crim. No. 11307. Court of Appeals of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division One. July 11, 1980.]

"Everyone is presumed to know the law" (Boehm v. Spreckels, 183 Cal. 239, 245 [191 P. 5]), and defendants herein, who, in the [253 Cal.App.2d 968] disseminated advertising materials, held themselves out to the public as experts in the law of trusts, taxation, and probate, are charged with knowledge of the aforementioned law applicable to such trusts. Even were defendants not charged with actual knowledge of the untrue or misleading nature of the statements relating to the legal consequences of pure trusts, they, by the exercise of reasonable care, should have known that the statements were untrue or misleading. The statements are made in an absolute, unqualified, and positive manner, and it has been said (Lerner v. Riverside Citrus Assn., 115 Cal.App.2d 544 , 547 [252 P.2d 744]) that if a person "makes such an absolute, unqualified and positive statement as implies knowledge on his part, when in fact he has no knowledge whether his assertion is true or false, and his statement proves to be false, he is as culpable as if he had wilfully asserted that to be true which he knew to be false. ..."
People ex rel. Mosk v. Lynam , 253 Cal.App.2d 959
[Civ. No. 31452. Second Dist., Div. One. Aug. 29, 1967.]

[5] The guarantee of due process of law includes the requirement of a reasonable degree of certainty in legislation. (People v. Superior Court (Caswell) (1988) 46 Cal.3d 381, 389 [250 Cal.Rptr. 515, 758 P.2d 1046].) To withstand a vagueness challenge, "a statute must be sufficiently definite to provide adequate notice of the conduct proscribed. '[A] statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of law. [Citations.]' [Citations.]" fn. 16 (Caswell, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 389.) In considering whether a legislative proscription is sufficiently clear to satisfy the requirements of fair notice, we consider not only the language of the challenged statute, but also its legislative history. (Walker v. Superior Court (1988) 47 Cal.3d 112, 143 [253 Cal.Rptr. 1, 763 P.2d 852].) "We thus require citizens to apprise themselves not only of statutory language but also of legislative history ... and underlying legislative purposes [citation]. [Citation.]" (Ibid.)
People v. Morse (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 259 , 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 816
[Nos. A058935, A060033. First Dist., Div. Three. Dec 22, 1993.]

[19] In considering whether a legislative proscription is sufficiently clear to satisfy the requirements of fair notice, "we look first to the language of the statute, then to its legislative history, and finally to California decisions construing the statutory language." (Pryor v. Municipal Court (1979) 25 Cal.3d 238, 246 [158 Cal.Rptr. 330, 599 P.2d 636]; People v. Mirmirani (1981) 30 Cal.3d 375, 383 [178 Cal.Rptr. 792, 636 P.2d 1130].) We thus require citizens to apprise themselves not only of statutory language but also of legislative history, subsequent judicial construction, and underlying legislative purposes (People v. Grubb (1965) 63 Cal.2d 614, 620 [47 Cal.Rptr. 772, 408 P.2d 100]). (See generally Amsterdam, The Void-For-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court (1960) 109 U. Pa. L.Rev. 67.) These principles express the strong presumption that legislative enactments "must be upheld unless their unconstitutionality clearly, positively, and unmistakably appears. [Citations.] A statute should be sufficiently certain so that a person may know what is prohibited thereby and what may be done without violating its provisions, but it cannot be held void for uncertainty if any reasonable and practical construction can be given to its language." (Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. Superior Court (1946) 28 Cal.2d 481, 484 [171 P.2d 21, 166 A.L.R. 701], citations omitted.)
Walker v. Superior Court (1988) 47 Cal.3d 112
[S.F. No. 24996. Supreme Court of California. November 10, 1988.]

Officer Young ordered Clement’s car towed because he believed the car was parked in a public lot in violation of the statute.

Even if the officer is not expected to know the law of all 50 states, surely he is expected to know the California Vehicle Code...
CLEMENT v. J & E SERVICE INC., No. 05-56692, March 11, 2008, UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

Even if the officer is not expected to know the law of all 50 states, surely he is expected to know the California Vehicle Code,...
THE PEOPLE v. JESUS SANTOS SANCHEZ REYES (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 856