Article 1. Imposition of Tax ....... 6051 - 6055

“Invito Beneficium Non Datur”
“No one is obliged to accept a benefit against his consent”





"Thou shall not have divers weight and measures but thou shall have a perfect and just weight a perfect and just measure."
(Deut. 25:13-15)





10 oz.   Pound
Consumer   Retailer
Consumer   Distributor

A "loan" or "front" or "borrow" involves "reimbursement".   It's self evident one can not "return" what was never "loaned" or "fronted".


4th Edition, 1968

FAKER. A petty swindler. National Automobile Ass'n v. Strunk, 122 Neb. 890, 240 N.W. 294.

FALSE REPRESENTATION. A representation which is untrue, willfully made to deceive another to his injury. See, also, Deceit and Fraud.

FALSE WEIGHTS. False weights and measures are such as do not comply with the standard prescribed by the state or government, or with the custom prevailing in the place and business in which they are used.

FALSE WITNESS. One who is intentionally rather than merely mistakenly false. State v. Weston, 109 Or. 19, 219 P. 180, 189.

FALSI CRIMEN. Fraudulent subornation or concealment, with design to darken or hide the truth, and make things appear otherwise than they are. It is committed (1) by words, as when a witness swears falsely; (2) by writing, as when a person antedates a contract; (3) by deed, as selling by false weights and measures. Wharton. See Crimen Falsi.

FALSE WORDS, which may be eliminated from descriptions in wills, deeds, etc., are misdescriptions of property that are not applicable to any property owned or intended to be devised or conveyed. Brown v. Ray, 314 Ill. 570, 145 N.E. 676, 679; Armstrong v. Armstrong, 327 III. 85, 158 N.E. 356, 358.



TRICK, v. t. To deceive ; to impose on;  to defraud; to cheat;  as, to trick another in the sale of a horse.

TRICK, v. t. [Celtic. W. treciaw, to furnish or harness, to trick out;  tree, an implement harness, gear, from rhec, a breaking forth properly a throwing or extending. This may be a varied application of the foregoing word.]
To dress; to decorate; to set off; to adorn fantastically.
Trick her off in air.  Pope
It is often followed by up, off, or out.
People are lavish in tricking up their children in fine clothes, yet starve their minds.

TRICK, v. i. To live by deception and fraud.  Dryden.

TRICK'ED, pp. Cheated; deceived; dressed.

TRICK’ER             )      
TRICK'STER        )     n.   One who tricks; a deceiver; a cheat.
TRICK ER             )    

TRICK’ERY, n. The art of dressing up; artificial stratagem.  Parr. Burke.




It is well established – indeed, appellant concedes – that the tax is imposed on the retailer and not the consumer.
Pac. Coast Eng. Co. v. State of California (1952) 111 Cal.App.2d 31

The Joke's On You Suckers!

3.  Sales tax reimbursement

As for consumers, although the sales tax falls on retailers and must be paid by them to the state, retailers are permitted but not required to obtain reimbursement for their tax liability from the consumer at the time of sale. (Civ. Code, 1656.1; 9 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law, supra, Taxation, 344, p. 498; 56 Cal.Jur.3d, supra, Sales and Use Taxes, 12, p. 25; 2 State Bd. of Equalization, Business Taxes Law Guide (2009) Sales & Use Tax Annots., Annots. Nos. 460.0020, p. 4760 [retailers are not required to collect reimbursement], 460.0023, p. 4760 [retailers may discount a price by the amount of the sales tax reimbursement], 460.0005, p. 4759 [retailers may advertise a price as free of sales tax].)
Loeffler v. Target Corp. (2014), 58 Cal.4th 1081

    1708.  Every person is bound, without contract, to abstain from injuring the person or property of another, or infringing upon any of his or her rights.
    1709.  One who willfully deceives another with intent to induce him to alter his position to his injury or risk, is liable for any damage which he thereby suffers.
    1710.  A deceit, within the meaning of the last section, is either:
        1.     The suggestion, as a fact, of that which is not true, by one who does not believe it to be true;
        2.     The assertion, as a fact, of that which is not true, by one who has no reasonable ground for believing it to be true;
        3.     The suppression of a fact, by one who is bound to disclose it, or who gives information of other facts which are likely to mislead for want of communication of that fact; or,
        4.     A promise, made without any intention of performing it.

    1711.  One who practices a deceit with intent to defraud the public, or a particular class of persons, is deemed to have intended to defraud every individual in that class, who is actually misled by the deceit.

    1712.  One who obtains a thing without the consent of its owner, or by a consent afterwards rescinded, or by an unlawful exaction which the owner could not at the time prudently refuse, must restore it to the person from whom it was thus obtained, unless he has acquired a title thereto superior to that of such other person, or unless the transaction was corrupt and unlawful on both sides.
    1713.  The restoration required by the last section must be made without demand, except where a thing is obtained by mutual mistake, in which case the party obtaining the thing is not bound to return it until he has notice of the mistake.
    1714.  (a) Everyone is responsible, not only for the result of his or her willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his or her want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his or her property or person, except so far as the latter has, willfully or by want of ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself or herself.   The design, distribution, or marketing of firearms and ammunition is not exempt from the duty to use ordinary care and skill that is required by this section.   The extent of liability in these cases is defined by the Title on Compensatory Relief.

William L. Prosser

Professor of Law
Hastings College of Law



Chapter 18


p. 683


        Misrepresentation runs all through the law of torts, as a method of accomplishing various types of tortious conduct which, for reasons of historical development or as a matter of convenience, usually are grouped under categories of their own.

        Thus a battery may be committed by feeding the plaintiff poisoned chocolates, or by inducing his consent to a physical contact by misrepresenting its character; false imprisonment may result from a pretense of authority to make an arrest, a trespass to land from fraudulent statements inducing another to enter, or a conversion from obtaining possession of goods by false representations; and a malicious lie may give rise to a cause of action for the intentional infliction of mental suffering.   A great many of the common and familiar forms of negligent conduct, resulting in invasions of tangible interests of person or property, are in their essence nothing more than misrepresentation, from a misleading signal by a driver of an automobile about to make a turn, or an assurance that a danger does no exist, to false statements concerning a chattel sold, or non-disclosure of a latent defect by one who is under a duty to give warning.   In addition, misrepresentation may play an important part in the invasion of intangible interests, in such torts as defamation, malicious prosecution, or interference with contractual relations.   In all such cases the particular form which the defendant's conduct has taken has become relatively unimportant, and misrepresentation has been merged to such an extent with other kinds of misconduct that neither the courts nor the legal writers have found any occasion to regard it as a separate basis of liability.
        So far misrepresentation has been treated as giving rise in and of itself to a distinct cause of action in tort, it has been identified with the common law action of deceit.   The reasons for the separate development of this action and for its peculiar limitations, are in part historical, and in part connected with the fat that in the great majority of the cases which have come before the courts the misrepresentations have been made in the course of a bargaining transaction between the parties.   Consequently the action has been colored to a considerable extent by the ethics of bargaining between distrustful adversaries.   Its separate recognition has been confined in practice very largely to the invasion of interests of a financial or commercial character, in the course of business dealings.  There is no essential reason to prevent a deceit action from being maintained, for intentional misstatements at a least, where other types of interests are invaded;   and there are a few cases in which it has been held to lie for personal injuries, for tricking the plaintiff into an invalid marriage or marriage with one who is physically unfit, or for inducing the plaintiff to leave a husband, or to incur criminal penalties.   In general, however, other theories of action have been sufficient to deal with non-pecuniary damage, and the somewhat narrower theory of deceit is one in which the plaintiff has parted with money, or property of value, in reliance upon the defendant's representations.

        The law of misrepresentation is thus considerably broader than the action for deceit.   Liability in damages for misrepresentation, in one form or another, falls into the three familiar divisions with which we have dealt throughout this text - it may be based upon intent to deceive, upon negligence, or upon a policy which requires the defendant to be strictly responsible for his statements without either.   For the most part, the courts have limited deceit to those cases where there is an intent to mislead, and have left negligence and strict liability to be dealt with in some other type of action.   There has been a good deal of overlapping of theories, and no little confusion, which has been increased by the indiscriminate use of the word "fraud," a term so vague that it requires definition in nearly every case.   Further difficulty has been added by a failure to distinguish the requisites of the action in tort at law from those of equitable remedies, and to distinguish the different forms of misrepresentation from one another, and misrepresentation itself from mere mistake.   Any attempt to bring order out of the resulting chaos must be at best a tentative one, with the qualification that many courts do not agree.
        The action of deceit is of very ancient origin.   There was an old writ of deceit known as early as 1201, which lay only against a person who had misused legal procedure for the purpose of swindling someone.   At a later period this writ was superseded by an action on the case in the nature of deceit, which became the general common law remedy for fraudulent or even non-fraudulent misrepresentation resulting in actual damage.   In particular, it was extended to afford a remedy for many wrongs which we should now regards as breaches of contract, such as false warranties in the sale of goods.   Its use was limited almost entirely to cases of direct transactions between the parties,, and it came to be regarded as inseparable from some contractual relation.   It was not until 1789, in Pasley v. Freeman, which is the parent of the modern law of deceit, that the action was held to lie where the plaintiff had had no dealings with the defendant, but had been induced by his misrepresentation to deal with a third person.   After that date deceit was recognized as purely a tort action, and not necessarily upon contract.   At about the same time, the remedy for a breach of warranty was taken over into an action of assumpsit, and it was thus established that it had a contract character.   Thereafter the two lines of recovery slowly diverged, although some vestiges of confusion between the two still remain in many courts, particularly as to the measure of damages.   The distinction was made clear in English courts by decisions holding that the tort action of deceit requires something in the way of knowledge of the falsity of the statement and an intention mislead, while the contact action on a warranty does not.

        The elements of the tort cause of action and deceit which it last emerged from this process of development frequently have been stated as follows:

1.   A false representation made by the defendant. In the ordinary case, this representation must be one of fact.

2.  Knowledge or belief on the part of the defendant that the representation is false - or, what is regarded as equivalent, that he has not a sufficient basis of information to make it.  This element often is given the technical name of “scienter.”

3.  An intention to induce the plaintiff to act or refrain from action in reliance upon the misrepresentation.

4.   Justifiable reliance upon the representation on the part of the plaintiff, and taking action or refraining from it.

5.  Damage to the plaintiff, resulting from such reliance.

        As will be seen, some of these elements have undergone modification or qualification in some jurisdictions.   In addition, it must be repeated that such an action of deceit is only one of several possible remedies for various forms of misrepresentation, even where there is only pecuniary loss.   Before proceeding to consider the elements of the cause of action and deceit, it is desirable to distinguish other theories upon which relief may be granted, the proximity of which has been a fertile source of the general confusion and uncertainty surrounding the deceit action itself.

Distinguished from Warranty and Negligence

        The divorce of warranty from deceit was completed by about the beginning of the 19th century.   By that time warranty had become identified, at least in lawyers usage, with the existence of a contract between the parties.  Although the original tort form of the action still survives as a possible procedural alternative, and the tort theory may have important consequences, there are only a limited number of cases, and those entirely concerned with the liability of a seller of goods to the ultimate consumer, in which warranty has been found without a contract.   Deceit, on the other hand, is essentially a tort action, and does not require the existence of any contract, although of course the tort itself may often coincide with one.   Furthermore, because of its contract character, warranty has become a matter of strict liability, without any wrongful intent or negligence on the part of the defendant, while deceit, as it developed in the law of England, is to be classified as an intentional tort, requiring knowledge or belief of falsity or conscious ignorance of the truth, and hence something of an intent to mislead.   In the American courts, the distinction is not always clearly drawn, and it is been obscured or abandoned in many jurisdictions by decisions which in effect taken over the strict liability of warranty and adopted it and deceit form of action.

        The same intentional element distinguished to see, as it is defined by the English courts and by many American jurisdictions, from negligence.   In finding the necessary “knowledge” as to the falsity of the representation, these courts of stop short of the situation where the defendant honestly believes that he knows and that his statement is true, but is negligent in not obtaining accurate information. There is nothing, however, to prevent an ordinary negligence action for the use of language in such a case; and while such an action is most often brought where damage which results is a personal injury, it has been extended, with a somewhat restricted scope, to cases involving financial or commercial loss.

        In some jurisdictions, then, the distinction as to the actions for deceit, negligence and warranty coincides in general with that as to intent, negligence and strict liability.   In many courts, however, these lines have been blurred or obliterated by an extension of the deceit action to cover all three types of liability.   The dispute over the proper form of action frequently as obscure the real question of whether the defendant should be held liable in the particular case.   With the declining importance of the foreman theory of the action under modern code pleading, it is the latter which is the really important problem, with which we must chiefly be concerned; and the discussion which is to follow looks to the nature of the defendant’s conduct rather than the form of his recovery.

Equitable Relief

        To the difficulties arising from the existence of these three strictly legal remedies, there must be added the further confusion resulting from the possibility of equitable relief.  Misrepresentation was recognized very early as a basis for the jurisdiction of courts of equity, at a time when the existing forms of actions at law were in adequate to deal with the injustices which resulted.
Page 687   

"Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference, and impart information and ideas through any media regardless of frontiers"
The United Nations' 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution



54950 DECLARATION OF LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE.   “In enacting this chapter, the Legislature finds and declares that the public commissions, boards and councils and the other public agencies in this State exist to aid in the conduct of the people’s business.  It is the intent of the law that their actions be taken openly and that their deliberations be conducted openly.
The people of this State do not yield their sovereignty to the agencies which serve them. The people, in delegating authority, do not give their public servants the right to decide what is good for the people to know and what is not good for them to know.  The people insist on remaining informed so that they may retain control over the instruments they have created”.