...or "BUSINESS" AS USUAL
CHAPTER 2. THE SALES TAX
Article 1. Imposition of Tax ....... 6051 - 6055
Beneficium Non Datur”
“No one is obliged to accept a benefit against
HARMONY - STATUS QUO - EQUILIBRIUM - FIDELITY
- JUSTICE - PARITY - EASE
REGULAR - NORMAL
DISHARMONY - DISPARITAS - AEQUILIBRIUM - INFIDELITY - INJUSTICE -
INEQUALITY - DISEASE
IRREGULAR - ABNORMAL
"Thou shall not have divers weight and measures but thou shall have a
perfect and just weight a perfect and just measure."
THE MAJORITY OF PEOPLE
STEAL = IMBALANCE
SIN = IMBALANCE
IMBALANCE = BAD
BALANCE = GOOD
BALANCE = ACCEPTABLE
IMBALANCE = UNACCEPTABLE
TRUE = BALANCE
FALSE = IMBALANCE
10 oz. ≠
"loan" or "front" or "borrow" involves "reimbursement". It's
self evident one can not "return" what was never "loaned" or "fronted".
FOLLOWING DEFINITIONS ARE LOCATED IN
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
4th Edition, 1968
FAKER. A petty
swindler. National Automobile Ass'n v. Strunk, 122 Neb. 890, 240 N.W.
REPRESENTATION. A representation which is untrue,
willfully made to deceive another to his injury. See, also, Deceit and
False weights and measures are such as do not comply with the standard
prescribed by the state or government, or with the custom prevailing in
the place and business in which they are used.
WITNESS. One who is intentionally rather than merely
mistakenly false. State v. Weston, 109 Or. 19, 219 P. 180, 189.
Fraudulent subornation or concealment, with design to darken or hide
the truth, and make things appear otherwise than they are. It is
committed (1) by words, as when a witness swears falsely; (2) by
writing, as when a person antedates a contract; (3) by deed, as selling
by false weights and measures. Wharton. See Crimen Falsi.
which may be eliminated from descriptions in wills, deeds, etc., are
misdescriptions of property that are not applicable to any property
owned or intended to be devised or conveyed. Brown v. Ray, 314 Ill.
570, 145 N.E. 676, 679; Armstrong v. Armstrong, 327 III. 85, 158 N.E.
FOLLOWING DEFINITIONS ARE LOCATED IN
TRICK, v. t. To deceive ;
to impose on; to defraud; to cheat; as, to trick
another in the sale of a horse.
v. t. [Celtic.
W. treciaw, to furnish or harness, to trick out; tree, an
implement harness, gear, from rhec, a breaking forth properly a
throwing or extending. This may be a varied application of the
To dress; to decorate; to set off; to adorn
Trick her off in air. Pope
It is often followed by up, off, or out.
People are lavish in tricking up their children
in fine clothes, yet starve their minds.
v. i. To
live by deception and fraud. Dryden.
pp. Cheated; deceived; dressed.
) n. One
who tricks; a deceiver; a cheat.
n. The art
of dressing up; artificial stratagem. Parr. Burke.
OF COURSE THEY DO! THEY AGREED TO PAY
THEY WANT PEOPLE TO BELIEVE OSH IS DOING THEM A FAVOR!
HAVE SOME MORE LIES AND BLATANT FRAUD
is well established – indeed, appellant concedes – that the tax is
imposed on the retailer and not the consumer.
Eng. Co. v. State of California (1952) 111 Cal.App.2d 31
The Joke's On You Suckers!
Sales tax reimbursement
for consumers, although the sales tax falls on retailers and must be
paid by them to the state, retailers are permitted but not required to
obtain reimbursement for their tax liability from the consumer at the
time of sale. (Civ. Code, § 1656.1; 9 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law,
supra, Taxation, § 344, p. 498; 56 Cal.Jur.3d, supra, Sales and Use
Taxes, § 12, p. 25; 2 State Bd. of Equalization, Business Taxes Law
Guide (2009) Sales & Use Tax Annots., Annots. Nos. 460.0020, p.
4760 [retailers are not required to collect reimbursement], 460.0023,
p. 4760 [retailers may discount a price by the amount of the sales tax
reimbursement], 460.0005, p. 4759 [retailers may advertise a price as
free of sales tax].)
Target Corp. (2014), 58 Cal.4th 1081
Every person is bound, without contract, to abstain from injuring the
person or property of another, or infringing upon any of his or her
One who willfully deceives another with intent to induce him to alter
his position to his injury or risk, is liable for any damage which he
deceit, within the meaning of the last section, is either:
suggestion, as a fact, of
that which is not true, by one who does not believe it to be true;
assertion, as a fact, of
that which is not true, by one who has no reasonable ground for
believing it to be true;
suppression of a fact, by
one who is bound to disclose it, or who gives information of other
facts which are likely to mislead for want of communication of that
promise, made without any intention of performing it.
One who practices a deceit with intent to defraud the public, or a
particular class of persons, is deemed to have intended to defraud
every individual in that class, who is actually misled by the deceit.
One who obtains a thing without the consent of its owner, or by a
consent afterwards rescinded, or by an unlawful exaction which the
owner could not at the time prudently refuse, must restore it to the
person from whom it was thus obtained, unless he has acquired a title
thereto superior to that of such other person, or unless the
transaction was corrupt and unlawful on both sides.
The restoration required by the last section must be made without
demand, except where a thing is obtained by mutual mistake, in which
case the party obtaining the thing is not bound to return it until he
has notice of the mistake.
Everyone is responsible, not only for the result of his or her willful
acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his or her want
of ordinary care or skill in the management of his or her property or
person, except so far as the latter has, willfully or by want of
ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself or herself.
design, distribution, or marketing of firearms and ammunition is not
exempt from the duty to use ordinary care and skill that is required by
this section. The extent of liability in these cases is
by the Title on Compensatory Relief.
Professor of Law
Hastings College of Law
WEST PUBLISHING CO.
Misrepresentation runs all through the
law of torts,
as a method of accomplishing various types of tortious conduct which,
for reasons of historical development or as a matter of convenience,
usually are grouped under categories of their own.
Thus a battery may be committed by
plaintiff poisoned chocolates, or by inducing his consent to a physical
contact by misrepresenting its character; false imprisonment may result
from a pretense of authority to make an arrest, a trespass to land from
fraudulent statements inducing another to enter, or a conversion from
obtaining possession of goods by false representations; and a malicious
lie may give rise to a cause of action for the intentional infliction
of mental suffering. A great many of the common and
familiar forms of negligent conduct, resulting in invasions of tangible
interests of person or property, are in their essence nothing more than
misrepresentation, from a misleading signal by a driver of an
automobile about to make a turn, or an assurance that a danger does no
exist, to false statements concerning a chattel sold, or non-disclosure
of a latent defect by one who is under a duty to give
warning. In addition, misrepresentation may play an
important part in the invasion of intangible interests, in such torts
as defamation, malicious prosecution, or interference with contractual
relations. In all such cases the particular form
defendant's conduct has taken has become relatively unimportant, and
misrepresentation has been merged to such an extent with other kinds of
misconduct that neither the courts nor the legal writers have found any
occasion to regard it as a separate basis of liability.
So far misrepresentation has been
treated as giving
rise in and of itself to a distinct cause of action in tort, it has
been identified with the common law action of
reasons for the separate development of this action and for its
peculiar limitations, are in part historical, and in part connected
with the fat that in the great majority of the cases which have come
before the courts the misrepresentations have been made in the course
of a bargaining transaction between the parties.
Consequently the action has been colored to a considerable extent by
the ethics of bargaining between distrustful
Its separate recognition has been confined in practice very largely to
the invasion of interests of a financial or commercial character, in
the course of business dealings. There is no essential reason
prevent a deceit action from being maintained, for intentional
misstatements at a least, where other types of interests are
invaded; and there are a few cases in which it has
held to lie for personal injuries, for tricking the plaintiff into an
invalid marriage or marriage with one who is physically unfit, or for
inducing the plaintiff to leave a husband, or to incur criminal
penalties. In general, however, other theories of
have been sufficient to deal with non-pecuniary damage, and the
somewhat narrower theory of deceit is one in which the plaintiff has
parted with money, or property of value, in reliance upon the
The law of misrepresentation is thus
broader than the action for deceit. Liability in
for misrepresentation, in one form or another, falls into the three
familiar divisions with which we have dealt throughout this text - it
may be based upon intent to deceive, upon negligence, or upon a policy
which requires the defendant to be strictly responsible for his
statements without either. For the most part, the
have limited deceit to those cases where there is an intent to mislead,
and have left negligence and strict liability to be dealt with in some
other type of action. There has been a good deal of
overlapping of theories, and no little confusion, which has been
increased by the indiscriminate use of the word "fraud," a term so
vague that it requires definition in nearly every
Further difficulty has been added by a failure to distinguish the
requisites of the action in tort at law from those of equitable
remedies, and to distinguish the different forms of misrepresentation
from one another, and misrepresentation itself from mere
mistake. Any attempt to bring order out of the
chaos must be at best a tentative one, with the qualification that many
courts do not agree.
The action of deceit is of very ancient
origin. There was an old writ of deceit known as
1201, which lay only against a person who had misused legal procedure
for the purpose of swindling someone. At a later
this writ was superseded by an action on the case in the nature of
deceit, which became the general common law remedy for fraudulent or
even non-fraudulent misrepresentation resulting in actual
damage. In particular, it was extended to afford a
for many wrongs which we should now regards as breaches of contract,
such as false warranties in the sale of goods. Its
limited almost entirely to cases of direct transactions between the
parties,, and it came to be regarded as inseparable from some
contractual relation. It was not until 1789, in
Freeman, which is the parent of the modern law of deceit, that the
action was held to lie where the plaintiff had had no dealings with the
defendant, but had been induced by his misrepresentation to deal with a
third person. After that date deceit was recognized
purely a tort action, and not necessarily upon
about the same time, the remedy for a breach of warranty was taken over
into an action of assumpsit, and it was thus established that it had a
contract character. Thereafter the two lines of
slowly diverged, although some vestiges of confusion between the two
still remain in many courts, particularly as to the measure of
damages. The distinction was made clear in English
by decisions holding that the tort action of deceit requires something
in the way of knowledge of the falsity of the statement and an
intention mislead, while the contact action on a warranty does not.
The elements of the tort cause of action
which it last emerged from this process of development frequently have
been stated as follows:
A false representation made by the defendant. In the ordinary case,
this representation must be one of fact.
Knowledge or belief on the part of the defendant that the
representation is false - or, what is regarded as equivalent, that he
has not a sufficient basis of information to make it. This
element often is given the technical name of “scienter.”
3. An intention to induce the plaintiff
to act or refrain from action in reliance upon the misrepresentation.
Justifiable reliance upon the representation on the part of the
plaintiff, and taking action or refraining from it.
5. Damage to the plaintiff, resulting
from such reliance.
As will be seen, some of these elements
undergone modification or qualification in some
jurisdictions. In addition, it must be repeated
an action of deceit is only one of several possible remedies for
various forms of misrepresentation, even where there is only pecuniary
loss. Before proceeding to consider the elements of
cause of action and deceit, it is desirable to distinguish other
theories upon which relief may be granted, the proximity of which has
been a fertile source of the general confusion and uncertainty
surrounding the deceit action itself.
from Warranty and Negligence
The divorce of warranty from deceit was
about the beginning of the 19th century. By that
warranty had become identified, at least in lawyers usage, with the
existence of a contract between the parties. Although the
original tort form of the action still survives as a possible
procedural alternative, and the tort theory may have important
consequences, there are only a limited number of cases, and those
entirely concerned with the liability of a seller of goods to the
ultimate consumer, in which warranty has been found without a
contract. Deceit, on the other hand, is essentially
action, and does not require the existence of any contract, although of
course the tort itself may often coincide with one.
Furthermore, because of its contract character, warranty has become a
matter of strict liability, without any wrongful intent or negligence
on the part of the defendant, while deceit, as it developed in the law
of England, is to be classified as an intentional tort, requiring
knowledge or belief of falsity or conscious ignorance of the truth, and
hence something of an intent to mislead. In the
courts, the distinction is not always clearly drawn, and it is been
obscured or abandoned in many jurisdictions by decisions which in
effect taken over the strict liability of warranty and adopted it and
deceit form of action.
same intentional element distinguished to see, as it is defined by the
English courts and by many American jurisdictions, from
negligence. In finding the necessary “knowledge” as
falsity of the representation, these courts of stop short of the
situation where the defendant honestly believes that he knows and that
his statement is true, but is negligent in not obtaining accurate
information. There is nothing, however, to prevent an ordinary
negligence action for the use of language in such a case; and while
such an action is most often brought where damage which results is a
personal injury, it has been extended, with a somewhat restricted
scope, to cases involving financial or commercial loss.
In some jurisdictions, then, the
distinction as to
the actions for deceit, negligence and warranty coincides in general
with that as to intent, negligence and strict
many courts, however, these lines have been blurred or obliterated by
an extension of the deceit action to cover all three types of
liability. The dispute over the proper form of
frequently as obscure the real question of whether the defendant should
be held liable in the particular case. With the
importance of the foreman theory of the action under modern code
pleading, it is the latter which is the really important problem, with
which we must chiefly be concerned; and the discussion which is to
follow looks to the nature of the defendant’s conduct rather than the
form of his recovery.
To the difficulties arising from the
these three strictly legal remedies, there must be added the further
confusion resulting from the possibility of equitable relief.
Misrepresentation was recognized very early as a basis for the
jurisdiction of courts of equity, at a time when the existing forms of
actions at law were in adequate to deal with the injustices which
ADVICE OFFERED NOR
has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes
freedom to hold opinions without interference, and impart information
and ideas through any media regardless of frontiers"
United Nations' 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.
First Amendment of the United States Constitution
NEITHER WARRANTY OFFERED
DECLARATION OF LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE. “In enacting
chapter, the Legislature finds and declares that the public
commissions, boards and councils and the other public agencies in this
State exist to aid in the conduct of the people’s business.
the intent of the law that their actions be taken openly and that their
deliberations be conducted openly.
people of this State do not yield their sovereignty to the agencies
which serve them. The people, in delegating authority, do not give
their public servants the right to decide what is good for the people
to know and what is not good for them to know. The people
on remaining informed so that they may retain control over the
instruments they have created”.