THE CONSQUENCES OF THE "STATUTORY" MARRIAGE
THE HUSBAND & WIFE
&
THE STATE GOVERNMENT CORPORATION
COUNT EM...
One of the first marriage licenses recorded in the United States was in
the 17th Century, around 1639, in colonial Massachusetts.
1691
- Virginia enacts a law stating that if a white person (bond or free)
marries a person of color (Negro, mulatto, or Indian), the couple will
be banished from the colony. Banishment means almost certain death in
the woods.
1769
- American colonies based their laws on the English common law, which
said, “By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in the law. The
very being and legal existence of the woman is suspended during the
marriage, or at least is incorporated into that of her husband under
whose wing and protection she performs everything.”
1865 - The Mississippi Black Code prohibits Blacks from marrying whites, punishable by life imprisonment.
1913 - The federal government formally recognizes marriage in law for the first time with the passage of the Revenue Act of 1913.
1948
- In Perez v. Sharp, California Supreme Court becomes first state high
court to declare a ban on interracial marriage unconstitutional. In
1967 the U.S. Supreme Court, in Loving v. Virginia, overturns all state
bans on interracial marriage, declaring that the “freedom to marry”
belongs to all Americans.
According to the North Carolina
History project, in 1741, the state increased control over marriages,
primarily to prohibit interracial marriages by issuing marriage
licenses. By the 1920s, some 38 other states had issued similar laws in
an effort to keep the white race "pure." Virginia's Racial Integrity
Act (RIA) of 1924 made it illegal for mixed-race couples to marry. The
RIA remained law until 1967 when the U.S. Supreme Court declared
Virginia's ban on interracial marriage unconstitutional.
In the United States prior to the
1700s, marriages were primarily a responsibility of local churches with
marriages registered only with the state. By the latter
part of the 19th century, states began to "nullify common-law marriages
and exert more control over who was allowed to marry," says Stephanie
Coontz in a 2007 "New York Times" article. The primary
reason for government control of marriage licenses remains for vital
statistics recording and continues as a source of revenue for local and
state governments.
https://oureverydaylife.com/history-marriage-licenses-6644194.html
"Marriage is a civil contract to which there are three parties. The husband, the wife and the state..."
Van Koten v. Van Koten, 154 N.E. 146 (1926)
Marriage is a three-party contract between the man, the woman, and the State.
Linneman v. Linneman, 1 Ill. App. 2d 48, 50, 116 N.E.2d 182, 183 (1953)
JUSTICE MAAG delivered the opinion of the court: This action was
brought in April of 1993 by Carolyn and John West (grandparents) to
obtain visitation rights with their grandson, Jacob Dean West. Jacob
was born January 27, 1992. He is the biological son of
Ginger West and Gregory West, Carolyn and John's deceased son…
However, this constitutionally protected parental interest is not
wholly without limit or beyond regulation. Prince v. Commonwealth of
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166, 88 L. Ed. 645, 64 S. Ct. 438, 442
(1944). "[T]he state has a wide range of power for limiting
parental freedom and authority in things affecting the child's
welfare." Prince, 321 U.S. at 167, 88 L. Ed. 645, 64 S. Ct. at
442. In fact, the entire familial relationship involves the State.
When two people decide to get married, they are required to first
procure a license from the State. If they have children of
this marriage, they are required by the State to submit their children
to certain things, such as school attendance and
vaccinations. Furthermore, if at some time in the future
the couple decides the marriage is not working, they must petition the
State for a divorce. Marriage is a three-party contract between the man, the woman, and the State.
Linneman v. Linneman, 1 Ill. App. 2d 48, 50, 116 N.E.2d 182, 183
(1953), citing Van Koten v. Van Koten, 323 Ill. 323, 326, 154 N.E. 146
(1926). The State represents the public interest in the institution of
marriage. Linneman, 1 Ill. App. 2d at 50, 116 N.E.2d at
183. This public interest is what allows the State to
intervene in certain situations to protect the interests of members of
the family. The State is like a silent partner in the family
who is not active in the everyday running of the family but becomes
active and exercises its power and authority only when necessary to
protect some important interest of family life. Taking all
of this into consideration, the question no longer is whether the State
has an interest or place in disputes such as the one at bar, but it
becomes a question of timing and necessity. Has the State
intervened too early or perhaps intervened where no intervention was
warranted? This question then directs our discussion to an
analysis of the provision of the Act that allows the challenged State
intervention (750 ILCS 5/607(b) (West 1996)).
West v. West, 689 N.E.2d 1215 (1998)
~~~~~~~~~
Roberts v. Roberts (1947) 81 Cal.App.2d 871
[Civ. No. 15818. Second Dist., Div. Two. Oct. 17, 1947.]
ROSALIE THERESA ROBERTS, Appellant, v. LEE ROBERTS, Respondent.
COUNSEL
Hardy and Hardy and Carlos S. Hardy for Appellant.
Reynolds, Painter & Cherniss and Louis Miller for Respondent.
OPINION
MOORE, P. J.
[4] In all domestic concerns each state of the Union is to be
deemed an independent sovereignty. As such, it is its
province and its duty to forbid interference by another state as well
as by any foreign power with the status of its own
citizens. Unless at least one of the spouses is a resident
thereof in good faith, the courts of such sister state or of such
foreign power cannot acquire jurisdiction to dissolve the marriage of
those who have an established domicile in the state which resents such
interference with matters which disturb its social serenity or affect
the morals of its inhabitants. [5] Jurisdiction over
divorce proceedings of residents of California by the courts of a
sister state cannot be conferred by agreement of the
litigants. [6] As protector of the morals of her people it
is the duty of a court of this commonwealth to prevent the dissolution
of a marriage by the decree of a court of another jurisdiction pursuant
to the collusion of the spouses. If by surrendering its
power it evades the performance of such duty, marriage will ultimately
be considered as a formal device and its dissolution freed from legal
inhibitions. [7] Not only is a divorce of California [81
Cal.App.2d 880] residents by a court of another state void because of
the plaintiff's lack of bona fide residence in the foreign state, but
it is void also for lack of the court's jurisdiction over the State of
California. [8] This state is a party to every marriage contract
of its own residents as well as the guardian of their
morals. Not only can the litigants by their collusion not
confer jurisdiction upon Nevada courts over themselves but neither can
they confer such jurisdiction over this state.
[9] It therefore follows that a judgment of divorce by a court of
Nevada without first having pursuant to its own laws acquired
jurisdiction over one of the parties is a void decree and may be
impeached in the state of the domicile and its effect erased by showing
that the Nevada court had no jurisdiction of the parties. (Kegley v.
Kegley, 16 Cal.App.2d 216, 220 [60 P.2d 482]; Ryder v. Ryder, 2
Cal.App.2d 426, 433 [37 P.2d 1069].) Such decree may always
be attacked for lack of jurisdiction in the foreign court. (Crouch v.
Crouch, supra, 250.)
[10] It is equally well settled that the collusion of the parties is
sufficient to render the decree voidable even though the court had had
jurisdiction and respondent had not fraudulently induced her to
institute the Nevada proceeding. (Ryder v. Ryder, supra.)
[11] The contention that appellant is estopped to plead the nullity of
a void decree because (1) it was procured by her in an alien
jurisdiction and (2) was the result of her instituting the action in
another state in collusion with respondent is not supported. Generally,
estoppel will not prevail to support either a decree granted by a
foreign court without jurisdiction of the parties or a decree obtained
by a wife at the direction of her husband. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1916;
Ryder v. Ryder, supra; Estate of Bruneman, 32 Cal.App.2d 606, 608 [90
P.2d 323]; Kegley v. Kegley, supra.) This rule is
emphasized in the instant case by the fraudulent conduct of respondent
in inducing appellant to procure a divorce and to visit Nevada for that
purpose at his expense. In the Kegley decision whose facts
parallel those at bar the appellant urged in support of his plea of
estoppel Bisconer v. Billing, 71 Cal.App. 779 [236 P. 329]; Eaton v.
Wilkins, 163 Cal. 742 [127 P. 71]; and Bruguiere v. Bruguiere, 172 Cal.
199 [155 P. 988, Ann.Cas. 1917E 122]. The first two are
distinguished by their facts and cast no light upon the issues here
involved except that in the Bisconer case the court held that there can
be no estoppel in pais against a plaintiff where he does not know the
full truth [81 Cal.App.2d 881] of the facts constituting the basis of
the alleged estoppel. In the Bruguiere case plaintiff's
husband had visited Nevada for the purpose of obtaining a
divorce. Although the decree granted him was void for lack
of jurisdiction in the court, Mrs. Bruguiere contracted another
marriage. After it had been annulled by the court of New
York she subsequently sued her first mate for support and
maintenance. Because she knew that the Nevada decree
purported to dissolve her marriage and to give her freedom to effect a
new marital alliance she was estopped to question the validity of the
Nevada divorce. She was free to waive all questions of the
effect upon her of such decree and accept the status it conferred upon
her. The Bruguiere case and many others hold to the
doctrine that a remarriage by a spouse who has acknowledged the
validity of the void decree estops him from subsequently denying its
validity. Because Mrs. Kegley had not remarried the court
denied the plea of estoppel filed by her husband, annulled the Mexican
decree and granted her a divorce although she had by her wilful
appearance in the Mexican court confessed the cruelties alleged.
[12a] Appellant's position is not different from that of Mrs. Kegley.
While the latter's decree was granted by the court of a sister
republic, she there confessed herself in the wrong. While
Mrs. Roberts actually sued for the divorce in a sister state, she was
persuaded to do so by the fraudulent inducements of her
husband. "He was the prime mover in the fraud upon the
Nevada Court." (Estate of Davis, 38 Cal.App.2d 579, 585 [101 P.2d 761,
102 P.2d 545].) To apply the doctrine of estoppel against
her would effectually guarantee the success of every husband who is so
base and so clever as to convince his wife that the welfare of herself
and her child will be enhanced by the entry of a divorce decree against
him in another state. [13] Estoppel is to be applied
against wrongdoers, not against the victim of a wrong. (Harlan v.
Harlan, 70 Cal.App.2d 657, 662 [161 P.2d 490]; Estate of Davis, supra.)
[14] It does not operate to defeat positive law or public policy.
(Panzer-Hamilton Co. v. Bray, 96 Cal.App. 460, 464 [274 P.
769].) [15] Where a divorce decree is void it cannot be
given validity by estoppel. (Garman v. Garman, 102 F.2d 272, 274 [70
App.D.C. 4], citing Kegley v. Kegley, supra.) [16] When
misapplied, the doctrine of estoppel may be a most effective weapon for
the accomplishment of injustice. (19 Am.Jur. 602.) [81 Cal.App.2d 882]
[12b] Respondent attacks count one as though it were purely a fraud
action whereby he is accused of obtaining the goods of appellant by his
false representations and promises and as though such averments had
been made as a basis of recovery. Such is not the office of
the allegations of respondent's fraudulent representations and of
appellant's physical, nervous and mental infirmities. While
the misrepresentations are not traversed and the causes of appellant's
bodily and mental ills are not alleged at length, yet the declarations
of the pleading show that respondent had the confidence of appellant
and that she believed his statement that it was for her own best
interest to do as he requested. Her mind and body had been
weakened; she was mentally distressed and distraught by reason of
her infirmities, and on account of such afflictions was incapable of
exercising an independent judgment with respect to respondent's
statements. By the demurrer he confesses that while she was
debilitated as a result of childbirth and of his demands that she
obtain a divorce he told her not only that his own financial interests
and welfare would be advanced but also that the best interests of her
child and herself would be served by his being divorced from her, and
that such divorce quietly obtained in another state would not interfere
with her marital relations or rob her of her position as his wife or of
living in their Long Beach home. He confesses that he urged
her to hasten her departure for Reno; that he supplied her with
the name of an attorney residing there who would aid her in
consummating the fraud; that he effected her departure within two days
after he had gained her promise to go to Nevada to obtain a decree; and
that he provided her with all funds necessary for her to accomplish his
plans which were a fraud upon the courts of California as well as of
Nevada.
Respondent contends that when a wife agrees with her husband that she
will visit a foreign jurisdiction to obtain a decree of divorce based
upon her simulated residence she cannot thereafter repudiate the decree
thus obtained by her. In support of such thesis he cites
and quotes from many authorities. By such authorities it is
held (1) that in divorce cases, as in others, equity will not interfere
with judgments obtained through collusion (Hendricks v. Hendricks, 216
Cal. 321, 323 [14 P.2d 83]; Bancroft v. Bancroft, 178 Cal. 359, 364
[173 P. 579, L.R.A. 1918F 1029]; Ettlinger v. Ettlinger, 46 Cal.App.2d
628, 632 [116 P.2d 482]; Lanktree v. Lanktree, [81 Cal.App.2d 883] 42
Cal.App. 648, 652 [183 P. 954]); (2) that where evidence of the
alleged coercion, duress or fraud could have been presented to the
court or to an attorney of complainant's own choosing during the
pendency of the action, seasonably to enable the court to protect the
rights of the parties, equity will not disturb the judgment of such
court (Hendricks v. Hendricks, supra; Godfrey v. Godfrey, 30 Cal.App.2d
370, 379 [86 P.2d 357]; Thompson v. Thompson, 38 Cal.App.2d 377 [101
P.2d 160]); (3) that a party who has obtained a decree of divorce upon
simulated residence in a foreign jurisdiction is estopped from
thereafter attacking the decree as invalid for want of jurisdiction in
the court (Harlan v. Harlan, supra; Estate of Davis, 38 Cal.App.2d 579,
584 [101 P.2d 761, 102 P.2d 545]; Seymour v. Seymour, 18 Cal.App.2d 481
[64 P.2d 168]; 1 Freeman on Judgments, 5th ed., § 1438; Rest. Conflict
of Laws, § 112).
While a number of the cited authorities have already been discussed,
neither they nor respondent's thesis are pertinent to the issues
presented by count one. In each instance the petitioner who
sought to have the foreign decree annulled was a free moral agent in
procuring the divorce, or he had sat passively by and knowingly
acquiesced in the action of his spouse in seeking the foreign decree,
or had financed her litigation, or had enjoyed the fruits of such
decree while acknowledging the validity thereof. Appellant here was the
agent of respondent in her journey to Nevada and in all that she did
while there in employing an attorney and in procuring a
decree. No part of it was her wish; neither was it her
deed. While weak and ill, she was by fraud persuaded by
respondent to consent to visit Nevada, to follow the directions of a
Reno attorney designated by respondent who paid him, to remain there
until a decree should be entered and then promptly to return to
California. Respondent confesses these abominable
facts. He is therefore without equity. With
unclean hands he attempts to thwart the efforts of the person to whom
he owes the highest duty but whom he has foully deceived to her
detriment. By raising the equitable plea of estoppel he
would silence her at the very threshold of the temple.
Under the long- established principles of equity he cannot shield his
own perfidious wrongs by use of a plea designed to silence only those
who have knowingly invited and accepted the causes of their
unhappiness. His own estoppel is estopped. The
judgment which she would have annulled by the superior court is the
fruitage of [81 Cal.App.2d 884] respondent's contempt for good morals
and of his disdain for the law of the state which protects
him. His citing respected authorities and his chanting fine
phrases concerning appellant's procurement of the divorce do not
conceal his guilt of sending his own ill wife away from her home and
her child to Nevada to obtain a divorce by committing perjury and by
imposing upon the courts of that state, knowing that she would return
to him immediately to resume the marital status. If the
plea of estoppel will permit such a practice it were better that the
very foundations of our jurisprudence should crumble into dust and a
new structure for the support of righteousness be builded.
Count One not Barred by Laches
[17] Respondent contends that the filing of this action, April 19,
1946, to annul the Nevada divorce decree of October 20, 1944, is barred
by laches, citing Rudy v. Slotwinsky, 73 Cal.App. 459, 465 [238 P.
783]; Wattson v. Dillon, 6 Cal.2d 33, 42 [56 P.2d 220]. So to hold
would be error. Upon appellant's return from Reno following
the entry of such decree she acted, and was treated, as the lawful wife
of respondent until December 25, 1945. As such wife she was his
constant companion for over 14 months; sat at his board and occupied
his bed. His sudden decision at the Christmas season to
drive her from the home and to stand firmly upon the Nevada decree must
have administered a shock, requiring some time for her to adjust her
senses to the predicament in which the new turn of affairs had left
her. Allowing one month for her to reconnoiter the field,
she filed the action within less than three months, a part of which
time was of necessity consumed by counsel in a study of the case and in
the preparation of her pleadings. Such delay is not unreasonable in
view of the circumstances alleged. In the Wattson case,
supra, the action to vacate a final decree was begun seven months after
its entry, while in the Rudy case the action to set aside the decree
was begun a year after the first judgment. And in neither
of them was any such equitable ground for relief alleged as that by
appellant herein in addition to the lack of jurisdiction in the Nevada
court and the fraud upon the courts of California.
[18] The doctrine of laches is not to be arbitrarily
applied. Whether a delay is unreasonable must be adjudged
by the circumstances which occasioned it, by the nature of the relief
demanded and by a determination that the rights of the defendant or of
others have not been prejudiced by the delay. [81 Cal.App.2d 885]
(Swart v. Johnson, 48 Cal.App.2d 829, 834 [120 P.2d 699].)
It would be unreasonable to say that any right of respondent suffered
prejudice by reason of appellant's not having filed her action at an
earlier date.
It follows that count one does state a valid cause of action; that by
treating its conclusions as harmless surplusage the special demurrers
count for nought; that by confession of respondent the Nevada decree is
void, and that the third count states a valid cause of
action. In view of the foregoing the demurrers to the first
and third counts should have been overruled.
Count Two
As to the second count of the complaint appellant's position is not so
favorable. By this cause appellant seeks to have annulled a contract of
property settlement executed in this state. An attack upon
that agreement is not to be aided by the invalidity of the divorce
decree. Neither may it find support in count one except by
such of the latter's allegations as were by adoption made a part of
count two. Even though by the doctrine of judicial notice
this court could determine that the nullity of the Nevada decree is to
be read into count two, such fact would not necessarily so support the
second count as to exempt it from the statutory rules of pleading by
which it must be measured.
[19] Since a separate general demurrer was not lodged against count
two, only the special demurrers thereto can be considered. (Lord v.
Garland, 27 Cal.2d 840, 850 [168 P.2d 5].) Certain of its allegations
are ambiguous, uncertain or unintelligible. [20] To plead
that the sum of $1,000 accepted by her as her share of the community
property "was less than the interest of plaintiff in said community
estate," does not state the extent of plaintiff's interest or the
extent of her title in and to the property which she claims was the
community estate. (California Trust Co. v. Gustason, 15 Cal.2d 268, 273
[101 P.2d 74].) Not facts but only a conclusion is
declared. In order to have alleged with certainty the detriment
suffered by her in accepting $1,000 for her interest in the community
estate it was necessary for her not only to describe the property and
to allege its reasonable value but also to set out facts disclosing the
extent of her community interest. (Burkett v. Griffith, 90 Cal. 532,
541 [27 P. 527, 25 Am.St.Rep. 151, 13 L.R.A. 707]; Hencken v. City of
Morgan Hill, 21 Cal.App.2d [81 Cal.App.2d 886] 438, 442 [69 P.2d
462].) The allegations do not make it certain whether the
property in question was acquired wholly with community funds or
whether a definite portion of the purchase price had been paid by the
defendant with his separate funds and a different proportion of the
purchase price was paid with community funds. The
allegation that $1,000 was less than plaintiff's interest is a mere
conclusion; is only inferential and argumentative. Without
the curing of such defect the special demurrer is fatal to the
pleading. [21] A fact which constitutes an essential
element of a cause of action cannot be left to an inference. (Los
Angeles v. Signoret, 50 Cal. 298; Johnson v. Fletcher, 97 Cal.App. 153,
156 [274 P. 1001].)
[22] The allegations of paragraph IV of the second count "that
plaintiff was without any opportunity by her to receive independent
legal advice as to her rights against the defendant relating to the
community property of the parties and to her support and maintenance by
him," and "that said purported agreement was unfair and unjust to her
... and is against public policy and therefore void," are inferential
and argumentative statements, conclusions and not direct averments of
material facts. (Hauser v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 133 Cal.App.
222, 225 [23 P.2d 1068]; Osborn v. Hoyt, 181 Cal. 336, 339 [184 P.
854]; Baker v. Miller, 190 Cal. 263, 266 [212 P. 11].) No
issue of fact is raised by such statements; no facts are alleged to
show that the agreement was unfair. Instead of such
declarations the pleading should contain averments showing the facts
(1) whereby she was debarred from opportunity to obtain independent
legal advice, (2) whereby the advice she received was not for her
advantage, and (3) from which the injustice of the agreement could be
derived. [23] The same vice obtains in the allegation that
"plaintiff was also under the influence, control and dominance of
defendant." Such language is a conclusion. To
have made such charge effective appellant should have declared the
facts that might show whether his dominance was due merely to the
conjugal relationship or to her fear of denying his wishes or to her
fear of losing custody of her child. [24] Also the
allegations that "had she been so informed and represented, she would
not have entered into and executed the said purported agreement nor
have accepted the consideration and benefits to her therein
expressed; ... said purported agreement ... is unfair and unjust
to plaintiff" are mere conclusions.
While count two alleges that the agreement was prepared by counsel of
respondent's selection "without any opportunity [81 Cal.App.2d 887] by
her to receive independent legal advice," thereby implying that
appellant was defrauded by respondent, yet there is no allegation that
the advice given her was illegal or unwise. [25] While the
pleading sounds primarily in undue influence, it makes no averment that
her illness rendered her incapable of understanding the
transaction. Since there is no allegation of either fraud,
menace or duress, the only attempt to plead an equitable cause is to be
found in the language that she was "physically sick and in a highly
nervous and mentally distraught state which was well known to
defendant; ... was also under the influence, control and dominance of
defendant; that plaintiff was not, by reason of her said
condition of health and by reason of said influence, control and
dominance, able to exercise independent judgment." Such
statements are not ultimate facts but conclusions only, and are not
sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (Estate of Streeton, 183
Cal. 284, 289 [191 P. 16]; Munfrey v. Cleary, 75 Cal.App.2d 779 [171
P.2d 750]; Estate of Sheppard, 149 Cal. 219, 220 [85 P. 312].)
[26] The second count contains no allegation of an offer to restore the
$1,000 paid appellant for her interest in the community
estate. There is no allegation of fact to show that her
share exceeds or is equal to $1,000. Her offer is not
sufficient. There is no allegation by which it can be
determined that if the agreement should be annulled she would in event
of a valid divorce be entitled to any share of the community
estate. The title to the property stands in respondent's
name. On a trial it may develop that it is his separate
estate. Since the action is for rescission and there is no
explanation why she did not return or offer to return the $1,000 the
special demurrer is fatal to count two. (Clanton v. Clanton, 52
Cal.App.2d 550, 554, 556 [126 P.2d 639]; Hite v. Mercantile Trust Co.,
156 Cal. 765, 767 [106 P. 102].)
Appellant has cited many authorities (Davis v. Davis, 49 Cal.App.2d 239
[121 P.2d 523]; Estate of Boeson, 201 Cal. 36 [255 P. 800]; Gaines v.
California Trust Co., 48 Cal.App.2d 709 [121 P.2d 28]; Norris v.
Norris, 50 Cal.App.2d 726 [123 P.2d 847]; Auclair v. Auclair, 72
Cal.App.2d 791 [165 P.2d 527]; Andrew v. Andrew, 51 Cal.App.2d 451 [125
P.2d 47]; Streeter v. Streeter, 67 Cal.App.2d 138 [153 P.2d 441]) that
would serve to support a complaint where reliance is placed upon undue
influence and upon a violation of the confidential
relationship. They do not avail her as support for
conclusions instead of ultimate facts. [81 Cal.App.2d 888]
Appellant having declined further to amend her complaint to conform
with the rules of pleading this court is without power to grant any
relief as to the property settlement. [27] A litigant is
entitled to prosecute his cause only by first pleading the nature of
relief sought and the ultimate facts by which he deems himself to be
entitled thereto under the law. If after the court's ruling
that his allegations are ambiguous or uncertain, or unintelligible, he
declines to amend and there is no error in the order, affirmance
thereof is the only answer to his appeal.
The judgment is affirmed insofar as it relates to the second count. As
to the first and third counts it is reversed with instructions to
overrule the demurrers as to them.
McComb, J., and Wilson, J., concurred.
-FN *. Section 9460, Nevada Compiled Laws, provides: "Divorce
from the bonds of matrimony may be obtained by complaint, under oath,
to the district court of any county in which the cause therefor shall
have accrued, or in which the defendant shall reside or be found, or in
which the plaintiff shall reside, or in which the parties last
cohabited, or if plaintiff shall have resided six weeks in the state
before suit be brought, for the following causes, or any other cause
provided by law: ...
Sixth. Extreme cruelty of either party."
The History of Marriage as an Institution
(NOT DEFINITIVE BUT SOME INTERESTING HISTORICAL POINTS)
WAKE UP STOOPIT! IT'S A MÉNAGE À TROIS.
BUT THE QUESTION IS; IS THE STATE THE HUSBAND OR THE WIFE?
ANOTHER FINE RESULT OF A PUBLIK SKOOL EDUCATION!
George Washington was married without a marriage license.
Historically, all the states in America had laws outlawing the marriage of blacks and whites. In the mid-1800’s, certain states began allowing interracial marriages or miscegenation as long as those marrying received a license from the state.
Early marriage contracts
In the earliest days of the broad issuance of marriage licenses, old marriage licenses represented a sort of business transaction.
As marriages were private affairs commenced between members of two families, the licenses were seen as contractual.
In
a patristic world, the bride may not have even known that the
“contract” was guiding the exchange of goods, services, and cash
holdings between two families.
Indeed,
the end of the marriage union was not only to ensure the prospect of
procreation, but also forged social, financial, and political alliances.
Further,
in the state-run organization widely known as the Church of England,
priests, bishops, and other clergy had a substantial say in authorizing
a marriage.
Eventually, the church’s influence was tempered by the creation of secular laws regarding marriage licensing.
While
creating a substantial revenue stream for the state, the licenses also
helped municipalities craft accurate census data. Today, marriage records are among the vital statistics held by developed nations.
From the State’s point of view, when you marry with a marriage license,
you are not just marrying your spouse, but you are also marrying the
State.
Black's Law Dictionary points
to this historical fact when it defines “marriage license” as, “A
license or permission granted by public authority to persons who intend
to intermarry.” “Intermarry” is defined in Black’s Law
Dictionary as, “Miscegenation; mixed or interracial marriages.”.
https://www.marriage.com/advice/license/unlocking-the-past-marriage-license-history/
Black’s Law Dictionary defines “license” as, “The
permission by competent authority to do an act which without such
permission, would be illegal.”
We need to ask ourselves - why should it be illegal to marry without the State’s permission?
More importantly, why should we need the State’s permission to
participate in something which God instituted (Gen.
2:18-24)?
We should not need the State’s permission to marry nor should we grovel
before state officials to seek it. What if you apply and
the State says “no”? You must understand that the authority
to license implies the power to prohibit.
A license by definition “confers a right”* to do something. The State cannot grant the right to marry.
When you marry with a marriage license, you grant the State jurisdiction over your marriage.
When you marry with a marriage license, your marriage is a creature of
the State. It is a corporation of the State!
Therefore, they have jurisdiction over your marriage including the
fruit of your marriage. What is the fruit of your marriage?
Your children and every piece of property you own.
Historically, there was no requirement to obtain a marriage license in
colonial America. When you read the laws of the colonies and then the
states, you see only two requirements for marriage. First, you had to
obtain your parents permission to marry, and second, you had to post
public notice of the marriage 5-15 days before the ceremony.
By issuing marriage licenses, the State is saying, “You don’t need your parents permission, you need our permission.”
https://comingintheclouds.org/christian-resources/family/marriage/no-marriage-license/
* PRIVILEGE
A license proper is a permit to do business which could not be done without the license.
CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO v. LIVERPOOL AND LONDON AND GLOBE INSURANCE COMPANY et al. (1887) 74 Cal. 113
A license in its proper sense is a permit to do business which could not be done without the license.
CITY OF SONORA v. J. B. CURTIN (1902) 137 Cal. 583
In California, a license is defined as "A permit, granted by an
appropriate governmental body, generally for a consideration, to a
person or firm, or corporation to pursue some occupation or to carry on
some business subject to regulation under the police power."
Rosenblatt v. California (1945) 69 Cal. App. 2d 69
Contracts based on, or that contain any element of fraud are either void or voidable. Thou Shalt Not Steal!
