Class C driver license required
The
primary device used, the
primary tool used, the primary equipment used in the transportation
business is the motor vehicle.
A MOTOR VEHICLE IS A DEVICE
(EQUIPMENT) USED FOR COMMERCIAL PURPO$E$
CALIFORNIA VEHICLE CODE
Commercial
Vehicle
260. (a)
A “commercial vehicle” is a motor vehicle of a type required to be
registered under this code used or maintained for the transportation of
persons for hire, compensation, or profit or designed, used, or
maintained primarily for the transportation of property.
(b)
Passenger vehicles and house cars that are not used for the
transportation of persons for hire, compensation, or profit are not
commercial vehicles. This subdivision shall not apply to Chapter 4
(commencing with Section 6700) of Division 3.
415. (a)
A "motor vehicle" is a vehicle...
670.
A "vehicle" is a device...
A motor vehicle or vehicle is considered "goods".
"Goods"
is personal property or chattel as opposed to real property (dirt).
“So
long as one uses his private property for private purposes
and
does not devote it to the public use, the public has no interest in it
and no voice in its control.
ASSOCIATED
PIPE LINE COMPANY (a
Corporation) v. RAILROAD
COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA et al, (1917) 176 Cal.
518.
WEST'S
ANNOTATED
CALIFORNIA COMMERCIAL CODE
© 1990
§9109.
Classification of Goods: "Consumer goods";
"Equipment";
"Farm Products"; "Inventory"
Goods are
(1) "Consumer
goods" if
they are used or bought for use primarily for personal, family or
household purposes;
(2) "Equipment"
if they are used or bought for the use primarily in business (including
farming or a profession) or by a debtor who is a nonprofit organization
or a government subdivision or agency or if the goods are not included
in the definitions of inventory, farm products, or consumer goods.
California
Code Comment
By John A. Bohn and Charles J. Williams
Prior California Law
1. The classification of
goods in this section is new statutory law. The significance
of
this classification is described in Official Comment 1.
Although
goods cannot belong to
more than one category at any time, they may change their
classification depending upon who holds them and for what
reason. Each classification is mutually exclusive
but the
four classifications described are intended to include all goods.
Official Comment 2.
REGISTRATION
OF THE DEVICE IS BASED
ON HOW IT'S USED

"Thus
self-driven vehicles are classified according to the use to which they
are put rather than according to the means by which they are propelled."
Ex Parte
Hoffert (1914) 34 S.D. 271, 148 N.W. 20
CIVIL CODE CONSUMER GOODS
1791.
As
used in this chapter:
(a) "Consumer
goods" means any new product or part thereof that is used, bought, or
leased for use primarily for personal, family, or household purposes,
except for clothing and consumables. "Consumer
goods" shall
include new and used assistive devices sold at retail.
PUBLIC UTILITIES CODE
208.
"Transportation of persons" includes every service in connection with
or incidental to the safety, comfort, or convenience of the person
transported and the receipt, carriage, and delivery of such person and
his baggage.
209.
"Transportation of property" includes every service in connection with
or incidental to the transportation of property, including in
particular its receipt, delivery, elevation, transfer, switching,
carriage, ventilation, refrigeration, icing, dunnage, storage, and
handling, and the transmission of credit by express corporations.
3950.
It is a violation of law for any person or corporation to operate, or
cause to be operated, on the highways of this state, any motor vehicle
in the transportation of property or passengers for compensation in
interstate commerce without having first complied with the requirements
of this chapter. That violation may be prosecuted and
punished as
provided in Section 16560 of the Vehicle
Code.
5108.
"Motor vehicle" means every motor truck, tractor, or other
self-propelled vehicle used for transportation of property over the
public highways, otherwise than upon fixed rails or tracks, and any
trailer, semitrailer, dolly, or other vehicle drawn thereby.
5110.5.
With respect to a motor vehicle used in the transportation of property
for compensation by a household goods carrier, "owner" means the
corporation or person who is registered with the Department
of
Motor Vehicles as the owner of the vehicle, or who has a legal right to
possession of the vehicle pursuant to a lease or rental agreement.
5352.
The use of the public highways for the transportation of passengers for
compensation is a business affected with a public
interest.
It is the purpose of this chapter to preserve for the public full
benefit and use of public highways consistent with the needs of
commerce without unnecessary congestion or wear and tear upon the
highways; to secure to the people adequate and dependable
transportation by carriers operating upon the highways; to
secure
full and unrestricted flow of traffic by motor carriers over the
highways which will adequately meet reasonable public demands by
providing for the regulation of all transportation agencies with
respect to accident indemnity so that adequate and dependable service
by all necessary transportation agencies shall be maintained and the
full use of the highways preserved to the public; and to
promote
carrier and public safety through its safety enforcement regulations.
The motor vehicle
is to the transportation business what the shoe lace
is to the shoe. It’s what flour is to
bread.
The
Department of Motor Vehicles regulates those employees in the
transportation business who use a motor vehicle to perform their tasks,
as well as regulating the motor vehicle itself.
This is
proper jurisdiction for this Department. This
Department is
a subagency of the CALIFORNIA STATE TRANSPORTATION
AGENCY.
It’s empowered to see to it that those using the streets and highways
for business purposes know what they’re doing and their tools are in
proper working order. This is germane to the
primary role
of the Legislature. They’re hired to ensure our
clearly
established constitutional rights and paramount unalienable interests
are protected and defended. Someone who doesn’t
know what
they’re doing regarding their job in an industry regulated by the State
government, could lead to personal and/or property damage which
includes denial of clearly established constitutionally secured
rights.
The
state has the authority to regulate the use of public highways for
bu$ine$$ purpo$e$.
Morel v.
Railroad Commission of California (1938) 11 Cal.2d 488
Yeah, the plates say CA EXEMPT
but they don’t say USED
NONCOMMERCIALLY. Is it possible to have a device
recognized
by the State as exempt while still being used for a public or other
commercial purpose?
There must have been a
time when people wondered how they could tell the difference between
someone using the streets for business from someone who doesn't.
Godfrey Daniels, we've got to come up with a plan!
PROBLEM
SOLVED: EVIDENCE of commerce. That which
distinguishes the
commercial from NONcommercial user of the streets and
highways.
Simple and efficient.
The
primary indicia of the commercial use of the streets and highways
is the DRIVER LICENSE and LICENSE PLATES. Those two
items
distinguish the commercial user from the noncommercial user.
“A
carriage is peculiarly a family or household
article. It
contributes in a large degree to the health, convenience,
comfort and
welfare of the householder or of the family”.
Arthur
v. Morgan.,
113 U.S. 495, 500, 5 S.Ct. 241, 243 (S.D.Ny 1884)
Automobile owned by individual not in business is ‘consumer
goods’”.
In re
Rave, 7 UCC rep. Serv 258
“An automobile purchased for personal and family use was ‘consumer
goods’”.
Bank
of Boston v. Jones, 4 UCC Rep. Serv. 1021, 236 A.2d. 484
“The
use of an automobile by its owner for purposes of traveling to and from
his work is a personal, as opposed to a business use as that term is
defined in the California Commercial Code 9109(1), and the automobile
will be classified as ‘consumer goods’ rather than
equipment. The phraseology of §9102(2) defining
goods used
or bought for use primarily in business seems to contemplate a
distinction between the collateral automobile ‘in business’ and the
mere use of the collateral automobile for some commercial, economic or
income producing purpose by one not engaged in ‘business’”.
In re
Barnes 11 USS rep. Serv. 697 (1972)
“Under the UCC §9-109 there is a real distinction between goods
purchased for personal use and those purchase for business
use. The
two are mutually exclusive and the principal use to which the property
is put should be considered as determinative”.
James
Talcott, Inc. v. Gee, 5 UCC rep. Serv. 1028, 266
Cal.App.2d. 384, 72 Cal.Reptr. (1968).
“The use to which an item is put rather than its physical
characteristics determine whether it should be classified as ‘consumer
goods’ under UCC §9-109(1) or ‘equipment’ under UCC
§9-109(2)”.
Grimes
v. Massey Ferguson, Inc., 23 UCC Rep. Serv. 655, 355 So.
2d. 338 (Ala., 1978)
“The classification of goods in UCC §9-109 are mutually
exclusive”.
McFadden
v. Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 8 UCC Rep.
Serv. 766, 260 Md. 601, 273, A.2d. 198 (1971)
“The term ‘household goods’..includes everything about the house that
is usually held and enjoyed therewith and that tends to the comfort and
accommodation of the household”.
Lawwill
v. Lawwill, 515 P.2d. 900, 903, 21 Ariz.App.75 , 19A Words and Phrases - Permanent
Edition (West) pocket part 94
“Automobile purchased for the purpose of transporting buyer to and from
his place of employment was ‘consumer goods’ as defined in UCC
§9-109".
Mallicoat
v. Volunteer Finance & Loan Corp.,
3 UCC Rep. Serv. 1035, 415 S.W.2d. 347 (Tenn.App.,
1966)
A
classification of motor vehicles, based on whether they are used for
business or commercial purposes, or merely kept for pleasure or family
use, a license fee being imposed in one case and not in the other, is a
proper one.
Ohio - Fisher
Bros. Co. v. Brown, 146 N.E. 100, III Ohio St. 602.
"This
law does not impose tax on motor vehicles and motor-cycles as property,
nor is it a tax on the person for the ownership of the
vehicle. It is a tax on the privilege of
using the
vehicle upon the public roads. It is in the nature
of a
toll for the use of the highway. Not the vehicle,
but the
privilege of using the vehicle, is taxed.
State
v. Lawrence (1914), 108 Miss. 291
Automobile
is the generic name which has been adopted by popular approval for all
forms of self-propelling vehicles for use upon highways and streets for
general freight and passenger service.
"The word 'automobile'
has a well-fixed significance in the popular
understanding.
It is understood to refer to a wheeled vehicle, propelled by gasoline,
steam, or electricity, and used for the transportation of persons and
merchandise."
"An automobile may be defined as a wheeled
vehicle, propelled by steam, electricity, or gasoline, and used for the
transportation of persons or merchandise. The
courts,
without making clear distinctions, have generally used the terms
automobile, motor vehicle, motor car,...
THE LAW OF AUTOMOBILES,
by C. P. BERRY of the ST. LOUIS BAR, 3rd Ed., 1921, p. 2
The word "vehicle" means any carriage moving on wheels or runners used,
or capable of being
used, as a means of transportation on land. 35
35.
Vehicle defined: "The word 'vehicle' includes every description of
carriage or other artificial contrivance used, or capable of being
used, as a means of transportation on land." U. S. Comp.
St. 1901, p. 4; Anderson's Law Diet., tit."Vehicle;" Black's Law Diet.,
tit. "Vehicle;" Bouvier's Law Diet., tit. "Vehicle."
A vehicle is "any carriage moving on land, either on wheels or on
runners."
Cent. Diet., tit. "Vehicle."
"Vehicle:
That in which anything is or may be carried, as a coach, wagon, cart,
carriage, or the like." Webster's Diet., tit. "Vehicle."
"A
vehicle is any carriage moving on land, either on wheels or runners; a
conveyance ; that which is used as an instrument of conveyance,
transportation or communication." Davis v. Petrinovich, 112 Ala. 654,
21 So. 354, 36 L. R. A. 615.
A sprinkling cart is a vehicle. St. Louis v. Woodruff, 71 Mo. 92.
An electric street car is a vehicle. Foster v. Curtis, 213 Mass. 79, 99
N. E. 961,
Ann. Cas. 1913E 1116 (1912).
Id. p. 22
Thus
an automobile used for hire in the District of Columbia, for which the
owner has a public hack license, is a vehicle within the meaning of a
police regulation which provides that vehicles for hire, seeking
employment, shall not loiter on the streets, except at the regular
public stands. But it was decided in another case
in the
District of Columbia, that an electric automobile, though a carriage,
does not belong to the classes of vehicles made the subjects of
license tax by an act imposing a tax on the proprietors of hacks, cabs,
omnibuses, and other vehicles for the transportation of passengers for
hire,...
id. p. 23
It is a rule of construction, little less
old than construction itself, that penal statutes, that is, statutes
which impose a penalty for their violation, must be strictly construed
as against the state and in favor of the accused.
Id., p. 44
Given
those court citations, are those of us not using our property for
any commercial purpose exempt from having a license and registering our
property?
...named
Catalla
CATALLA.
In old English law. Chattels. The word
among the
Normans primarily signified only beasts of husbandry, or, as they are
still called, "cattle," but, in a secondary sense, the term was applied
to all movables in general, and not only to these, but to whatever was
not a fief or feud.
Wharton.
Catalla juste possasea amitti non posunt.
Chattels justly possessed caunot be lost.
Jenk. Cent. 28.
IMPOUND
= TAKING A CAR AWAY
CEPIT ET ABDUXIT.
He took and led away. The emphatic words in writs
in
trespass or indictments for larceny, where the thing taken was a living
chattel, i. 6., an animal.
CEPIT
ET ASPORTAVIT.
He took and carried away. Applicable in a
declaration in
trespass or an indictment for larceny where the defendant has carried
away goods without right. 4 Bl. Comm. 23l.
CEPIT
IN ALIO LOCO.
In pleading. A plea in replevin, by which the
defendant
alleges that he took the thing replevied in another place than that
mentioned in the declaration. 1 Chit. Pl. 490.
CHATTEL.
An article of personal property; any species of
property
not amounting to a freehold or fee in land. The name given
to
things which in law are deemed personal property. Chattels
are
divided into chattels real and chattels personal; chattle
real
being interests in land which devolve after the manner of personal
estate, as leaseholds. As opposed to freeholds, they are
regarded
as personal estate. But, as being interests in real estate,
they
are called "chattels real," to distinguish them from movables, which are
called "chattels personal." Mozley &
Whitley.
Chattels personal are movables only;
chattels real are such as savor only of the realty. 19 Johns.
73.
The
term "chattels" is a a more comprehensive one than "goods", as
it
includes animate as well as inanimate property. 2 Chit. Bl.
Comm.
383, note. In a devise, however, they seem to be of the same
import. Shep. Touch. 447 ; 2 Fonbl Eq. 335.
p. 197
CHEMIN.
The road wherein every man goes; the king's high way.
p. 200
CHIMIN.
In old English law. A road, way, highway. It is
either the queen's highway (chiminus regina:) or a private
way. The
first is that over which the subjects of the realm, and all others
under the protection of the crown, have free liberty to pass, though
the
property in the soil itself belong to some private individual; the last
is that in which one person or more have liberty to pass over the land
of another, by prescription or charter. Warton.
p. 200, 201
CHIMINUS.
The way by which the king and all his subjects and all under
his
protection had a right to pass, though the property of the soil of each
side where the way may belong to a private man. Cowell.
p. 201
The previous terms are from Black's Law Dictionary, 1st Edition, DOWNLOAD
COERCION.
Compulsion; force; duress. It may be either actual, (direct or
positive,) where physical force fa put upon a man to compel him to do
an act against hie will, or implied,
(legal or constructive.) where the relation of the parties is such that
one is under subjection to the other, and is thereby constrained to do
what his free will would refuse.
p. 216, 217
The
"police power" is applicable to COMMERCIAL CONDUCT.
1.
LICENSES (§ 5*) - CHAUFFEURS.
The occupation of a chauffeur
is one calling
for regulation and therefore permitting a regulatory license tax.
[Ed. Note. - For other cases,
see licenses, Cent. Dig §§4, 19; dec. Dig. § 5*]
2.
STATUTES (§ 81*) - SPECIAL LEGISLATION - CLASSIFICATION.
Dividing,
as does St. 1913, p. 639, drivers of automobiles into two classes, one
professional chauffeurs, and requiring them to obtain a license, and
pay an annual fee of $2, the other embracing all others, who are not
required to secure a license or pay a license fee, is sound
classification and not arbitrary, so as to constitute special
legislation.
Ex
parte Stork, 167 Cal. 294 (Supreme Court of
California. Feb. 24, 1914)
And
former section 9109*, in classifying goods, provides: "Goods are (1)
'consumer goods' if they are used or bought for use primarily for
personal, family or household purposes; (2) 'equipment' if they are
used or bought for use primarily in business. ..."
It is
not without [266 Cal.App.2d 388] significance that the definition of
goods in the Unruh Act parallels the definition of consumer goods in
the Commercial Code.
* The
Legislature has modified that section. Notwithstanding what's
presently there, the definitions, regardless of their current
locations, have not changed.
[3]
Thus, there is a
real distinction between goods purchased for personal use and goods
purchased for business use. The two are mutually
exclusive,
and the principal use to which the property is put should be considered
as determinative.
James
Talcott, Inc. v. Gee , 266 Cal.App.2d 384
[Civ. No. 31802. Second Dist., Div. Five. Oct. 4, 1968.]
It should
be apparent by now that we’ve been mislead in a very big
way. That misleading constitutes
fraud. I posit
that people have been subject to fraud which lead to their decision to
go to the DMV and ask for permission to do something they had no
intention of doing. The State has benefited from
the fraud
perpetrated by everyone that you can’t go anywhere for any reason in a
car, truck, van, or motor cycle without a license, without government
employee’s permission and paying for the permission first.
Title 37, American Jurisprudence
2d at section 8 states, in part:
"Fraud vitiates every transaction and all
contracts.
Indeed, the principle is often stated, in broad and sweeping language,
that fraud destroys the validity of everything into which it enters,
and that it vitiates the most solemn contracts, documents, and even
judgments."
Vitiate
To impair or make void; to destroy or annul, either completely or
partially, the force and effect of an act or instrument.
Mutual mistake or
Fraud, for example, might vitiate a contract.
West's
Encyclopedia of American Law, edition 2. Copyright 2008 The Gale Group,
Inc. All rights reserved.
vitiate
- verb abolish, abrogate, annul, blight, cancel, counteract, damage,
depravare, destroy, disannul, impair, injure, invalidate, make faulty,
make imperfect, make immure, make ineffective, make void, mar, negate,
negative, neutralize, nullify, overturn, pervert, poison, pollute,
quash, render defective, render inefficacious, rescind, reverse, spoil,
sully, tamper with, undo, vitiare, weaken
Foreign phrases: Crimen omnia ex se
nata vitiat. Crime vitiates all that is born of it.
Title
42, CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS, Ch. IV, Subchapter C, Part 455,
Section 455.2 - Definitions.
§ 455.2 Definitions.
As
used in this part unless the context indicates otherwise—
Abuse means provider practices that are inconsistent with sound fiscal,
business, or medical practices, and result in an unnecessary cost to
the Medicaid program, or in reimbursement for services that are not
medically necessary or that fail to meet professionally recognized
standards for health care. It also includes
beneficiary
practices that result in unnecessary cost to the Medicaid program.
Conviction or Convicted means that a judgment of conviction has been
entered by a Federal, State, or local court, regardless of whether an
appeal from that judgment is pending.
Credible allegation of fraud. A credible allegation
of
fraud may be an allegation, which has been verified by the State, from
any source, including but not limited to the following:
(1) Fraud hotline complaints.
(2) Claims data mining.
(3) Patterns identified through provider
audits,
civil false claims cases, and law enforcement
investigations. Allegations are considered to be
credible
when they have indicia of reliability and the State Medicaid agency has
reviewed all allegations, facts, and evidence carefully and acts
judiciously on a case-by-case basis.
Exclusion means that items or services furnished by a specific provider
who has defrauded or abused the Medicaid program will not be reimbursed
under Medicaid.
Fraud means an
intentional
deception or misrepresentation made by a person with the knowledge that
the deception could result in some unauthorized benefit to himself or
some other person. It includes any act that constitutes fraud under
applicable Federal or State law.
Furnished
refers to items and services provided directly by, or under the direct
supervision of, or ordered by, a practitioner or other individual
(either as an employee or in his or her own capacity), a provider, or
other supplier of services. (For purposes of denial of reimbursement
within this part, it does not refer to services ordered by one party
but billed for and provided by or under the supervision of another.)
Practitioner means a physician or other individual licensed under State
law to practice his or her profession.
Suspension means that items or services furnished by a specified
provider who has been convicted of a program-related offense in a
Federal, State, or local court will not be reimbursed under Medicaid.
[48 FR 3755, Jan. 27, 1983, as amended at 50 FR 37375, Sept. 13, 1985;
51 FR 34788, Sept. 30, 1986; 76 FR 5965, Feb. 2, 2011]
JURISDICTION
the power to hear and determine a case. 147 P.2d 759,
761.
This power may be established and described with reference to
particular subjects or to parties who fall into a particular
category. In addition to the power to adjudicate, a
valid
exercise of jurisdiction requires fair notice and an opportunity for
the affected parties to be heard. Without
jurisdiction, a
court's judgment is void. A court must have both
SUBJECT
MATTER JURISDICTION and PERSONAL JURISDICTION (see below).
See
also territorial jurisdiction; title jurisdiction."
SUBJECT
MATTER JURISDICTION
refers to the competency of the court to hear and determine a
particular category of cases. Federal district
courts have
"limited" jurisdiction in that they have only such jurisdiction as is
explicitly conferred by federal statutes. 28 U.S.C. §1330 [EDITOR'S
NOTE: see also 40 U.S.C.S. §255] et seq. See LIMITED
[SPECIAL]
JURISDICTION. Many state trial courts have
"general"
jurisdiction to hear almost all matters. The
parties to a
lawsuit may not waive a requirement of subject matter jurisdiction.
TERRITORIAL
JURISDICTION
the territory over which a government or a subdivision thereof has
jurisdiction, 147 P.2d 858, 861; relates to a tribunal's power with
regard to the territory within which it is to be exercised, and
connotes power over property and persons within such territory. 94 N.E.
2d 438, 440.
A court cannot lift itself by its own bootstraps,
i.e., it cannot acquire jurisdiction by a declaration that it has
jurisdiction.
CALIFORNIA
PROCEDURE, Second Edition, by B. E. WITKIN,
Volume, 3(a) §232
How does
the Traffic Court
acquire jurisdiction to adjudicate a traffic matter?
1. The topic.
2. A complaint.
3. A legitimate arrest.
4. You being the subject to the rule
allegedly violated.
Let’s
take No. 1, the TOPIC. Traffic Court deals with
TRAFFIC grievances. Obviously the TRAFFIC COURT
deals with
violations of rules that apply to TRAFFIC and TRAFFIC
regulation.
The question then becomes, WHAT’S TRAFFIC?
TRAFFIC.
Commerce; trade; sale or exchange of merchandise, bills, money, and the
like. The passing of goods or commodities from one
person
to another for an equivalent in goods or money. Senior v.
Ratterman, 44 Ohio St. 673, 11 N.E. 321; Fine v. Moran, 74 Fla. 417, 77
So. 533, 538; Bruno v. U.S., C.C.A.Mass., 289 F. 649, 655; Kroger
Grocery and Baking Co. V. Schwer, 36 Ohio App. 512, 173 N.E.
633. The subjects of transportation on a route, as
persons
or goods; the passing to and fro of persons, animals, vehicles, or
vessels, along a route of transportation, as a long a street, canal
etc. United States v. Golden Gate Bridge and Highway Dist. of
California , D.C.Cal., 37 F. Supp. 505, 512.
Black’s
Law Dictionary,
4th Ed., p. 1667
COMMERCIAL.
Relating to or connected with trade and traffic
or commerce
in general. “Zante Currents”, C.C.Cal.,73 F. 189.
Occupied
with commerce. Bowles v. Co-Operative G. L. F. Farm Products,
D.C.N.Y., 53 F. Supp. 413, 415.
Black’s Law
Dictionary, 4th Ed., p. 337
INTERSTATE
COMMERCE.
Traffic,
intercourse, commercial trading, or the transportation of persons or
property between or among the several states of the Union, or from
between points in one state and points in another state; commerce
between the states, or between places in different
states.
It comprehends all the component parts of commercial intercourse
between different states. [Cites omitted]
Black’s Law
Dictionary, 4th Ed., p. 955
Traffic
- Webster's
Unified Dictionary and Encyclopedia, International Illustrated Edition
(1960)
1. Business or trade,
commerce. 2.
Transportation. 3. The movement of vehicles on street or
highway,
as, the traffic is very heavy today.
Traffic
- Bouvier's
Law Dictionary (1856)
Commerce, trade, sale or exchange of
merchandise, bills, money and the like.
Traffic
- Black's
Law Dictionary 3rd. Ed
Commerce; trade; sale or exchange of
merchandise,
bills, money, and the like. The passing of goods or
commodities from one person to another for an equivalent in goods or
money. Senior v. Ratterman, 44 Ohio St. 673, 11 N.E. 321; People v.
Horan, 293 Ill. 314, 127 N.E. 673, 674; People v. Dunford, 207 N.Y. 17,
100 N.E. 433, 434; Fine v. Morgan, 74 Fla. 417, 77 So. 533, 538; Bruno
v. U. S. (C.C.A.) 289 F. 649, 655. Traffic includes
the
ordinary uses of the streets and highways by travelers. Stewart v. Hugh
Nawn Contracting Co., 223 Mass. 525, 112 N.E. 218, 219; Withey v.
Fowler Co., 164 Iowa, 377, 145 N.W. 923, 927.
Traffic
- Black's
Law Dictionary 6th. Ed
Commerce; trade; sale or exchange of
merchandise,
bills, money, and the like. The passing or exchange
of
goods or commodities from one person to another for an equivalent in
goods and money. The subjects of transportation on
a route,
as persons or goods; the passing to and fro of persons, animals,
vegetables, or vessels, along a route of transportation, as along a
street, highway, etc.
Traffic
- Florida
Words & Phrases
(See Fine v. Moran, 77 So. 533, 538)
Everyone knows you
CAN NOT exercise any clearly established constitutionally secured
rights
unless you finish
skool, NOT DROP OUT!
Know what
else they enforce? State regulated commercial
activity. Driving is commerce.
They enforce
commercial rules. The very rules in the Vehicle
Code.
Those rules apply to people who deliver people or stuff for
a
living like an UBER driver. Next time you see one
of those
cars check the plates. That device is being used
for
commercial purposes but it has a STANDARD GARDEN VARIETY EVERY DAY
PLATE like what's on your ride. If what the UBER
dude or
dudette is doing with their car is legit with a STANDARD
GARDEN VARIETY EVERY DAY PLATE then what's that tell you in spite of
the fact there's both commercial and noncommercial plates and there's
commercial and noncommercial driver license. The "non"
variant must be "legal terms of art". Res ipsa
loquitur. How can you come to any other conclusion
based on
ALL the
government sources that's been provided on this page alone?
Don't know what
"legal term of art" means? Billy Boy
Clinton
sure as hell does. He was once an
attorney and Prezodunt.
Member during the impeachment hearing and a question was
posed
to which he responded, "It depends on what the definition of is
is.". I'll bet a lot-o-folks around the country
didn't
quite get
the inside legal joke and thought he was bein a smart ass.
Then there were those legal eagles who knew precisely what
the
former Adulterer In Chief said. LEGAL TERM OF ART.
LEGAL
TERM OF ART = BLACK
MEANS WHITE
I
would have to say that would be correct legal interpretation of the
law. Dealin with the laws of nature down in the sewer every day, I can say
we at the Sanitation Department know a little somethin about the law
alright!
The word
"traffic" is defined in Webster's New
International Dictionary as follows: "To pass goods and
commodities from one person to another for an equivalent in goods or
money; to buy or sell goods; to barter; trade." The subjects of
manufacturing; producing; storing; selling, and handling any commodity
are matters properly connected with the subject or traffic or trade in
that commodity.
CALIFORNIA PENAL CODE
484d. As used in
this section and Sections 484e to 484j, inclusive:
(9)
"Traffic"
means to transfer or otherwise dispose of property to
another, or to obtain control of property with intent to transfer or
dispose of it to another.
None of
those
definitions provide the term “congestion”, as in traffic means
congestion. The term “traffic” is typically used
instead of
“congestion” to mean a mass of cars on the road at the same time in the
same place slowing movement to a crawl.
Unfortunately the
use of the term “traffic” is completely incorrect but people act as if
it’s not nor could be. So based on the foregoing
Traffic
Court adjudicates commercial grievances.
Let’s
take another term that’s traditionally wrong when used,
“driving”. No one has seen the legislative
definition of
that word because the Legislature has not defined it yet everyone knows
without question what it means. It means, to the
majority
of people, going somewhere in a car while sitting behind the steering
wheel. Unfortunately, like the term traffic, that’s
an
incorrect definition even though 99.9% of everyone believes that’s what
it means. Driving, when considering all the
circumstantial
evidence provided by hundreds if not thousands of State and federal
court cases where “commerce” or “business” is the central theme tying
them all together. Driving is a
job. Driving is
an occupation. Driving is a
profession. A
driver is an employee. The term driver is a job
description. And in order to qualify for the job of
driver
the applicant is required to have a valid driver
license.
That should tell the reader something. You will not
be
hired by Domino’s or Pizza Hut to deliver their pizzas unless you have
a valid driver license. You will not be hired by
FTD
Florist to deliver their flowers unless you have a valid driver
license. The driver license permits employment in
the
TRANSPORTATION BUSINESS as a driver. In California
a cab
driver has the same class license as the majority have in their
wallets, Class C. One might argue that the Class C
license
stands for Class Commercial. The license is
required to be
hired as a driver at a cab company. There is no
special
business license other than the Class C required to be hired as a cab
driver.
DRIVER.
One employed...
Bouvier’s
Law Dictionary,
1856
DRIVER
-- one
employed in conducting a coach, carriage, wagon, or other vehicle..."
BOUVIER'S
LAW DICTIONARY,
(1914) p. 940.
DRIVER.
One employed...
Black’s
Law Dictionary,
4th Ed, 1951
Did you
go to the DMV to ask for permission to do something because
you were told by adults you had to or you’d get into
trouble? Did you know you were going to the DMV to
ask for
your government employee’s permission to work in the TRANSPORTATION
BUSINESS? Remember, the DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR
VEHICLES is a
department within the CALIFORNIA STATE TRANSPORTATION
AGENCY.
The CALIFORNIA STATE TRANSPORTATION
AGENCY
regulates TRANSPORTATION or the COMMERCIAL use of the streets and
highways.
As was
said by the supreme court of West Virginia (Dickey v. Davis, 76
W. Va. 576 [L. R. A. 1915F, 840, 85 S. E. 781]):
"The
right of a citizen to travel upon the highway and transport his
property thereon in the ordinary course of life and business differs
radically and obviously from that of one who makes the highway his
place of business and uses it for private gain, in the running of a
stage coach or omnibus. The former is the usual and
ordinary right of a citizen, a common right, a right common to all;
while the latter is special, unusual and
extraordinary. As
to the former, the extent of legislative power is that of
regulation; but as to the latter its power is broader; the
right
may be wholly denied, or it may be permitted to some and denied to
others, because of its extraordinary nature. This
distinction, elementary and fundamental in character, is recognized by
all the authorities."
The
argument is that the privilege of
using the public highways as a place for the transaction of private
business is not a vested right but a privilege which the state may
grant or withhold at its pleasure; that having the right to
withhold such privilege it may grant the same upon such terms and
conditions as it may see fit to impose; that it may say in
effect
to the applicant for such privilege, "I will grant you the privilege of
using the public highways for private gain in the transaction of your
business upon the condition that you in turn shall dedicate the
property used by you in such business to the public use of public
transportation." There is much force in this
contention. It has been repeatedly decided that the
right
of a common carrier to use the public highways for the conduct of his
business as such is not a vested or natural right, but is a mere
privilege or license which the legislature may grant or withhold in its
discretion, or which it may grant upon such conditions as it may see
fit to impose (Ex parte Lee, 28 Cal. App. 719 [153 Pac. 922]; Hadfield
v. Lundin, 98 Wash. 657 [Ann. Cas. 1918C, 942, L. R. A. 1918B, 909, 168
Pac. 516]; Le Blanc v. City of New Orleans, 138 La. 243 [70 South.
212]; Greene v. City of San Antonio (Tex. Civ. App.), 178 S. W. 6;
Gizzarelli v. Presbrey, 44 R. I. 333 [117 Atl. 359]; Morin v. Nunan, 91
N. J. L. 506 [103 Atl. 378]; Lutz v. City of New Orleans, 235 Fed. 978;
Cummins v. Jones, 79 Or. 276 [155 Pac. 171]; Packard v. Banton, 264
U.S. 140 [68 L. Ed. 596, 44 Sup. Ct. Rep. 264]; Memphis St. Ry. Co. v.
Rapid Transit Co., 133 Tenn. 99 [Ann. Cas. 1917C, 1045, L. R. A. 1916B,
1143, 179 S. W. 635]; Cutrona v. Mayor, etc. (Del.), 124 Atl. 658;
Taylor v. Smith, 140 Va. 217 [124 S. E. 259]; Schoenfeld v. Seattle,
265 Fed. 726; Ex parte Tindall, 102 Okl. 192 [229 Pac. 125]; Public
Service Com. v. Fox, 96 Misc. Rep. 283 [160 N. Y. Supp. 59]; Ex parte
Sullivan, 77 Tex. Cr. 72 [178 S. W. 537]; Child v. Bemus, 17 R. I. 230
[12 L. R. A. 57, 21 Atl. 539]; Ex parte Bogle, 78 Tex. Cr. 1 [179 S. W.
1193]; Fifth Ave. Coach Co. v. New York, 194 N. Y. 19 [16 Ann. Cas.
695, 21 L. R. A. (N. S.) 744, 86 N. E. 824]). The
supreme
court of Washington said in Hadfield v. Lundin, supra: "If
any
proposition may be said to be established by authority, the right of
the state in the exercise of its police power to prohibit the use of
the streets as a place of private business, or as the chief
instrumentality in conducting such business, must be held so
established. Nor can it be questioned that the
power to
prohibit includes the power to regulate even to the extent that the
regulation under given conditions may be tantamount to a
prohibition. Where the power to prohibit exists,
the
reasonableness of any regulation is palpably a legislative question,
pure and simple." The foregoing cases all had to do
with
the right of common carriers. Whether the same rule
should
apply with equal force to private carriers engaged in using the streets
as a place of private business or as the chief instrumentality in
conducting such business has not been directly passed upon in any case
which has come to our notice except as it may be said to have been
impliedly adjudged in State v. Price, 122 Wash. 421 [210 Pac.
787]. Upon principle, however, we perceive no reason why the
rule
should not apply with equal force to the case of a private carrier who
proposes to use the street as a place of private business or as the
chief instrumentality thereof. The rule does not
rest upon
the circumstance alone that the carrier is engaged in operating a
public utility and that his business is therefore affected with a
public interest, but it rests equally upon the circumstance that he is
using the public highways as the chief instrumentality of a private
business conducted for private gain. In other words, he is enjoying a
special privilege in the highways which are constructed and maintained
at public expense and designed for the common use of all.
MARION
L. FROST et al. v. RAILROAD COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA et al.
(1925) 197 Cal. 230, Supreme Court of California
The
“common use” is going to visit family or friends.
The
“common use” is going to one’s place of worship.
The
“common use” is going to the grocery store. The
“common
use” is taking the kids to school. The “common use”
is
going to the movies or the beach. Hence, “common
use” means
NONCOMMERCIAL PERSONAL OR HOUSEHOLD TRAVEL PURPOSE.
The
Legislature has not criminalized “running errands” or “chores” or
going to the movies. Does the Legislature have the
power to
force the people to pay for the privilege of using the streets and
highways to “run errands”? Does the Legislature
have the
power to force the people to pay to use their car to go to their place
of worship? Who owns your car?
Who owns the
streets?
CIVIL CODE
SECTION
678-703
678.
The
ownership of property is either:
1. Absolute; or,
2. Qualified.
679. The ownership of property is absolute when
a single person
has the absolute dominion over it, and may use it or dispose of it
according to his pleasure, subject only to general
laws.
680.
The
ownership of property is qualified:
1. When it is shared with one or more persons;
2. When the time of enjoyment is deferred or
limited;
3. When the use is restricted.
The
California Vehicle Act, makes a distinction between the “owner” of a
vehicle, the party having the use thereof, and the “legal owner”, the
party having neither legal title or a mortgage thereon.
Eckhardt
v.
Morley (1934) 220 C. 229.
The term “owner” as defined in this section does
not include “legal owner”.
29
Ops.Atty.Gen. 34
There
maybe several “owners” of automobile at any one time for purposes of
section imposing liability on owners, and fact that one was at not time
registered owner does not preclude actual ownership and resulting
responsibility.
McClary
v.
Concord Ave. Motors (1962) 202 C.A.2d 564.
A
certificate of registration does not necessarily or conclusively
establish ownership of automobile and a different ownership may be
shown for purpose of establishing liability under Veh.C.1935,
§402 (repealed; see, now, §17150 et seq.), imputing to owner the
negligence of a permissible user.
Roddy v.
Winn
(1958) 162 C.A.2d 53
Definition
of “owner” in this section does not apply under all circumstances; one
may be considered an owner of an automobile though title has not been
transferred to him in manner required by Code.
Everly
v.
Creech (1956) 139 C.A.2d 651.
[3]
It has been held that a certificate of registration does not
necessarily or conclusively establish true ownership and that a
different ownership may be shown under certain circumstances which
would bring the true owner within the provisions of section 402 of the
Vehicle Code. (McCalla v. Grosse, 42 Cal.App.2d 546 [109 P.2d 358].)
Logan v.
Serpa, 91 Cal.App.2d 818
[Civ. No. 3772. Fourth Dist. May 13, 1949.]
[2]
It has been held that under section 186 of the Vehicle Code, pertaining
to the transfer of title or any interest in a vehicle, a certificate of
registration does not necessarily or conclusively establish true
ownership. (Gates v. Levers, supra; Logan v. Serpa, 91 Cal.App.2d 818,
822 [206 P.2d 70]; Lynn v. Herman, supra; Henry v. General Forming,
Ltd., 33 Cal.2d 223 [200 P.2d 785].)
Davis v.
Joseph, 148 Cal.App.2d 899
[Civ. No. 5341. Fourth Dist. Mar. 4, 1957.]
CALIFORNIA
PROBATE CODE
§13050(b) for
purposes of this part, all of the
following property shall be excluded in determining the
property or estate of the decedent or its value:
(1)
Any vehicle registered under division 3 (commencing with Section 4000)
of the Vehicle Code or titled under Division 16.5 (commencing with
Section 38000) of the Vehicle Code.
Did you
indavertently divest
yourself of a property right by registering it?
Presumptively everyone who has a car knows all
that.
Presumptively everyone with a car knows why they “have to” register it
and have plates on it. Presumptively everyone with
a driver
license knows what the license permits.
Presumptively
everyone with a driver license knows what driving
is.
Presumptively everyone with a driver license knows what a motor vehicle
is.
This
contains
definitions of words.
This
contains
definition of words.
When
it comes to law, the type of dictionary to refer to for definitions of
words in the Codes or Statutes is the green one.
Those
contain definitions of words too. Here's some.
It's a
funny thing though. The two dictionaries have
definitions of the word “driver”, “driving”, and "drive" but the
Vehicle Code, the very book that regulates driving and drivers,
doesn’t. The
Legislature
makes the law and they provide definitions of terms in each code.
No where in those 5 volumes has the Legislature (who wrote all the
stuff in them and ordered them published), didn't include the
definition of "driver", "driving", or "drive".
If, as
everyone believes, they drive when they use
their car to go somewhere, then why hasn’t the Legislature provided
that definition so people know what the conduct
is?
How come it’s not defined in ANY of the California Codes?
Check
this from:
California
Forms of Pleading and Practice--Annotated
Copyright 2012, Matthew Bender & Company,
Inc., a member of the LexisNexis Group.
Volume 8: Automobiles-Chs. 80-92
Chapter 92 AUTOMOBILES:
DRIVERS' LICENSES
PART II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. State's Authority to Control Drivers
8-92 California Forms of Pleading and Practic e--
Annotated § 92.11
Page 27
[2]
Drive
The
meaning of "drive," which is used in the statutory definition of
"driver's license" (see [1], above), is not given in the Vehicle Code,
and apparently no court has construed it in the context of that
definition. The ordinary meaning of "drive" with reference
to a
motor vehicle is "to operate the mechanism and controls and direct the
course of" the vehicle or, intransitively, "to operate a vehicle"
[Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (1988); Estate of Richartz
(1955) 45 Cal. 2d 292, 294, 288 P.2d 857 (statutory words should be
given ordinary meanings unless Legislature otherwise clearly intended
or indicated); see also Panopulos v. Maderis (1956) 47 Cal. 2d 337,
342, 303 P.2d 738 (equating "driving" with being "in actual physical
control of a vehicle," the words of former Veh. Code § 69 which defined
"driver")].
That all
may be, however the Legislature, the law
making body of government, left out the TWO PRIMARY DEFINITIONS, DRIVER
and DRIVE/DRIVING. It’s like God leaving the part out of
the Bible of the shape of
the Earth. So what, are we born
with the
knowledge the Earth's shape so why bother telling everyone because
they already know? Likewise, are we born knowing
what
"driver", "driving", and "drive" is so why bother providing a
definition? In spite of all that, there's PLENTY of evidence
so
one with reasonably functional frontal lobes can ascertain just what
"driver" and "driving" is.
Why
didn’t the assholes who make the law define what the license permits
and why don’t the publik skools bother to teach the kids anything about
it? Everyone who uses a car, truck, van, motorcycle, or
other
machine
with a combustion engine in it to go somewhere believes that means
"driving". That belief IS NOT based on ANYTHING in the
Vehicle Code, or any other code for that matter because the word has
not been defined by the LAW MAKING BODY OF GOVERNMENT.
Feeling a little mislead? You should!
THOSE
RETARDS DIDN'T DEFINE THE VERY CONDUCT THE LICENSE PERMITS AND YOU'VE
NEVER SEEN THE DEFINITION IN YOUR ENTIRE LIFE PROVIDED BY THE SAME
RETARDS WHO PENNED THE VEHICLE CODE THAT YOU PAID TO HAVE WRITTEN.
If
there was a test containing a question asking for the definition of
"driving", you'd get it wrong, the LEGAL definition you'd get
wrong. You see, there's TWO sets of definitions, LEGAL or
TECHNICAL
and CONVENTIONAL or COLLOQUIAL. Which do you suppose is used
to
define the words in laws? That would be the green book up
there
not the 5 volume books. Uh, by the way, which part of the
machine is the motor vehicle because the thing that actually propels it
is called a COMBUSTION ENGINE, not an ELECTRIC MOTOR. People
often call things by names that don't actually apply, and when it comes
to cars and trucks and traffic tickets that could be fatal.
CALIFORNIA
VEHICLE CODE
415. (a) A "motor vehicle" is a
vehicle...
670.
A "vehicle" is a device..
CARRIER
= SOMEONE
WHO DELIVERS PERSONS OR PROPERTY AS AN OCCUPATION
DRIVE
= COMMERCIAL
CONDUCT = DELIVERY OF PERSONS OR PROPERTY
DRIVING
= COMMERCIAL
CONDUCT = DELIVERIES OF PERSONS OR PROPERTY
DRIVER
= EMPLOYEE =
MAKES DELIVERIES
MOTOR
VEHICLE =
EQUIPMENT/TOOL
PASSENGER
= CUSTOMER
TRANSPORTATION
=
COMMERCIAL CONDUCT
TRAFFIC
= COMMERCE
= BUSINESS
DRIVER
LICENSE
= EVIDENCE OF THE STATE'S PERMISSION TO ENGAGE IN A STATE
REGULATED
BUSINESS (TRANSPORTATION)
DEPARTMENT
OF MOTOR VEHICLES
= DEPARTMENT THAT REGULATES TRANSPORTATION
EMPLOYEES AND
THEIR TOOLS
CALIFORNIA
TRANSPORTATION AGENCY
= SELF EXPLANATORY
For those
who may not be familiar
with "CREDIBLE SOURCE" as it pertains
to law, when the Supreme Court talks it's a good idea to listen, or
read, because they're the last stop of the WHO'S TELLIN THE TRUTH
TRAIN. HELL NO, they don't ALWAYS get it right but it's a
real
damn good idea to read their decisions any way.
And another cool thing about Supreme and Appellate level rulings, cool
if you're interested in history, you'll be provided with a details
historical overview of what's goin on. The judges
at that
level have the best researchers on the planet. Why reinvent
the
wheel when all you gotta do is find the ones already invented?
The
state has the authority to regulate the use of public highways for
bu$ine$$ purpo$e$.
Morel v.
Railroad Commission of California (1938) 11 Cal.2d 488
The device is U$ED for
COMMERCIAL purposes.
That
device is being used to ADVERTISE. That device is a BILL
BOARD
for the product offered. It's being U$ED for
COMMERCIAL
PURPO$E$. Notice it's got a typical/standard license plate
as
opposed to a COMMERCIAL license plate. In spite of that fact
a
peace officer will apply the rules of commerce applicable to that
person to everyone else even though they don't do what they what the
Jeepster does. Seems unfair doesn't it?
$tandard
plate, device u$ed for commercial purpose$
$tandard
plate, device$ u$ed for commercial purpose$

$tandard
plate, device u$ed for commercial purpose$
$tandard
plate, device u$ed for commercial purpose$
CONTRAST
THOSE IMAGES WITH
THIS:
Standard
plate, device reflects NO EVIDENCE, NO INDICATION OF COMMERCIAL USE.
COMMERCIAL
plate, device used for COMMERCIAL purpose$.
COMMERCIAL
u$e
COMMERCIAL u$e
COMMERCIAL u$e
COMMERCIAL u$e

WEST’S ANNOTATED
COMMERCIAL CODE
© 1990
§9109.
Classification of Goods: “Consumer goods”; “Equipment”; “Farm
Products”; “Inventory”
Goods
are
(1) “Consumer goods”
if they are used or bought for use primarily for personal, family or
household purposes;
(2)
“Equipment”
if they are used or bought for the use primarily in business (including
farming or a profession) or by a debtor who is a nonprofit organization
or a government subdivision or agency or if the goods are not included
in the definitions of inventory, farm products, or consumer goods.
California
Code Comment
By John A. Bohn and Charles J. Williams
Prior California Law
1. The classification of goods
in this section
is new statutory law. The significance of this classification
is
described in Official Comment 1.
Although goods cannot belong to more
than one
category at any time, they may change their classification depending
upon who holds them and for what reason. Each classification
is
mutually exclusive but the four classifications described are intended
to include all goods.
Official Comment 2.
“The
activity licensed by state DMVs
- the
operation of motor
vehicles
- is
itself integrally related to
interstate commerce”.
Seth
Waxman, Solicitor
General
U.S.
Department of
Justice
BRIEF
FOR THE
PETITIONERS * (click to go
get it)
Reno
v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, January 12, 2000
Supreme
Court of the
United States
(*
The Supreme Court DID
NOT USE
that exact language in their holding. But because the Supreme
Court found in favor of US Inc. they ACKNOWLEDGED what US Inc asserted
in their Brief, DRIVING IS COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY REQUIRING A LICENSE (the
State's permission)!)
CALIFORNIA
PUBLIC UTILITY CODE
5108. "Motor vehicle"
means every motor truck, tractor, or other self-propelled vehicle used
for transportation of property over the public highways, otherwise than
upon fixed rails or tracks, and any trailer, semitrailer, dolly, or
other vehicle drawn thereby.
CALIFORNIA
VEHICLE CODE
100.
Unless
the provision or context otherwise requires,
these definitions shall govern the construction of this code.
305.
A "driver" is a person who drives or is in actual physical
control of a vehicle. The term "driver" does not include the tillerman
or other person who, in an auxiliary capacity, assists the driver in
the steering or operation of any articulated firefighting apparatus.
415.
(a) A "motor vehicle" is a
vehicle...
670.
A "vehicle" is a device...
15210(p)(8)
In
the absence of a federal definition, existing definitions under this
code apply.
I'd
have included the definition of "drive" and "driving" but the
Legislature didn't bother defining those words. No problem,
you'll be able to figure it out based on all the federal definitions.
REMEMBER:
US Inc. grants FEDERAL HIGHWAY FUNDS to CALIFORNIA Inc.
In order for CALIFORNIA Inc. to get the $$$ they had to enter
into a contract with Uncle Sam. That contract, like any
contract, contains TERMS & conditions. The TERMS
(words) are
defined that Cal Inc. agreed to use. Here's some really
important TERMS the fedz have been kind enough to define.
You'll
note they too didn't bother with the definition of the VERB the license
permits. By the way, what people actually apply for when
they go
to the DMV is PERMISSION. When it comes the the exercise and
utilization of your clearly established constitutionally secured rights
you don't require your employee's permission, you had that when you got
here.
COMMERCIAL or NONCOMMERCIAL TRAVEL?
Code of Federal Regulations
Title
49, Volume 4, Parts 200 to 399
Revised as
of October 1, 1999
Page 859 -
865
TITLE
49 -- TRANSPORTATION
CHAPTER
III
-- FEDERAL HIGHWAY ADMINISTRATION,
DEPARTMENT
OF TRANSPORTATION
PART 390 --
FEDERAL MOTOR CARRIER SAFETY REGULATIONS; GENERAL
Subpart A --
General Applicability and Definitions
Sec.
390.5 Definitions.
Driver
means any person who operates any commercial motor vehicle.
Interstate
commerce means trade, traffic,
or transportation in the United States--
(1) Between a place in a State and a place outside of such State
(including a place outside of the United States);
(2) Between two places in a State through another State or a place
outside of the United States; or
(3) Between two places in a State as part of trade, traffic, or
transportation
Intrastate
commerce means any trade, traffic,
or transportation in any State which is not described in the term
``interstate commerce.''
Motor
vehicle means any vehicle, machine, tractor, trailer, or
semitrailer propelled or drawn by mechanical power and used
upon the highways in the transportation of passengers or property,
Operator
--
See driver.
While,
as pointed out in Bosse v. Marye, supra, one may be an operator of an
automobile within the meaning of the Motor Vehicle Act without actually
driving the same, on the other hand, under the definition applying
under the terms of the act, one
who actually drives the machine is an operator. (Sec. 18
of Motor Vehicle Act; Stats. 1923, p. 519.)
HELEN
I. PONTIUS v. G. T. McLAIN et al. (1931), 113 Cal. App.
452,
Civ. No. 350, COURT OF APPEAL OF CALIFORNIA, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
Title
18, United States Code, Sec. 31
PART
I - CRIMES
CHAPTER
2 - AIRCRAFT
AND MOTOR VEHICLES
Sec.
31. Definitions
When used
in this chapter the term -
''Motor
vehicle'' means every description of carriage or other contrivance
propelled or drawn by mechanical power and used for commercial purposes
on the highways in the transportation of passengers, passengers and
property, or property or cargo. ''Used for commercial
purposes''
means the carriage of persons or property for any fare, fee,
rate, charge or other consideration, or directly or indirectly in
connection with any business, or other undertaking intended
for
profit;
Automobile
owned by individual not in business is "consumer
goods”.
In re
Rave,
7 UCC rep. Serv 258.
An automobile purchased for personal and family
use was ‘consumer goods’”.
Bank of
Boston v. Jones, 4 UCC Rep. Serv. 1021, 236 A.2d. 484
“The use of an automobile by its owner for
purposes of traveling to and
from his work is a personal, as opposed to a business use as that term
is defined in the California Commercial Code 9109(1), and the
automobile will be classified as ‘consumer goods’ rather than
equipment. The phraseology of §9102(2) defining goods used or
bought
for use primarily in business seems to contemplate a distinction
between the collateral automobile ‘in business’ and the mere use of the
collateral automobile for some commercial, economic or income producing
purpose by one not engaged in ‘business’”.
In re
Barnes,
11 USS rep. Serv. 697 (1972)
“Under the UCC §9-109 there is a real distinction
between goods
purchased for personal use and those purchase for business
use. The
two are mutually exclusive and the principal use to which the property
is put should be considered as determinitive”.
James
Talcott, Inc. v. Gee, 5 UCC rep. Serv. 1028, 266
Cal.App.2d. 384, 72 Cal.Reptr. (1968).
“The use to which an item is put rather than its
physical
characteristics determine whether it should be classified as ‘consumer
goods’ under UCC §9-109(1) or ‘equipment’ under UCC
§9-109(2)”.
Grimes
v.
Massey Ferguson, Inc., 23 UCC Rep. Serv. 655, 355 So. 2d.
338 (Ala., 1978)
“The classification of goods in UCC §9-109 are
mutually exclusive”.
McFadden
v.
Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 8 UCC Rep.
Serv. 766, 260 Md. 601, 273, A.2d. 198 (1971)
“The term ‘household goods’includes everything
about the house that
is usually held and enjoyed therewith and that tends to the comfort and
accommodation of the household”.
Lawwill
v.
Lawwill, 515 P.2d. 900, 903, 21 Ariz.App.75 , 19A Words
and Phrases - Permanent Edition (West) pocket part 94.
“Automobile purchased for the purpose of
transporting buyer to and from
his place of employment was ‘consumer goods’ as defined in UCC
§9-109".
Mallicoat
v.
Volunteer Finance & Loan Corp., 3 UCC Rep.
Serv. 1035, 415 S.W.2d. 347 (Tenn.App.,
1966)
“A carriage is peculiarly a family or household
article. It
contributes in a large degree to the health, convenience, comfort and
welfare of the householder or of the family”.
Arthur
v.
Morgan., 113 U.S. 495, 500, 5 S.Ct. 241, 243 (S.D.Ny 1884)
Courts have no right, no power, to extend statute
by construction, so
as to dispense with any conditions legislature has seen fit to
impose.
Gassner v. Patterson, (1863) 23 C. 299; likewise, the Courts must take
the statute as they find it. It is their duty to
construe it as it
stands enacted. Callahan v. San Francisco, (1945) 68 CA2d.
286, 156
P.2d. 479; Santa Clara County Dist. Atty.
Investigators
Asso. v. Santa Clara County (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d. 255, 124
Cal.Rptr. 115.
USED for NONcommercial travel purposes
Courts
are not at liberty to extend application of law to subjects not
included within it.
Spreckles
v.
Graham (1924) 194 C. 516
“So long as one uses his private
property for private purposes and
does not devote it to the public use, the public has no interest in it
and no voice in its control.
Associated
Pipe v. Railroad Commission (1917) 176 Cal. 518.
The
state has the authority to regulate the use of public highways for
bu$ine$$ purpo$e$.
Morel v.
Railroad Commission of California (1938) 11 Cal.2d 488
And
so courts have, in this connection, distinguished "licensed" vocations
from vocations "lawful per se."
U.S. v.
McFarland (1907) 28 App. D.C. 552,;
Peginis v. Atlanta (1909) 132 Ga. 302
But,
as has been said, "a license law ... assumes the illegality of the
business, and denounces penalties upon those who pursue it without
previously protecting themselves by procuring a license."
State v.
Parker Distilling Co. (1911) 236 Mo. 219
A
license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be
unlawful. The purpose of it is to regulate and
control the
manner in which the business is conducted, and prevent its being
carried on in such a way as to ignore the public interest.
Palmetto Fire
Ins. Co. v. Beha (1926) 13 F.2d 500 (S.D. N.Y.)
A
license is generally issued to an individual on account of his peculiar
fitness for the business, trade or profession which he is licensed to
carry on, for the purpose of identification and regulation, and in
either case to allow the license to be transferred would be to thwart
the purpose and intent of the law.
THE LAW OF AUTOMOBILES,
by C. P. BERRY of the ST. LOUIS BAR, 3rd Ed., 1921, p. 107
"License"
is frequently used in a secondary sense to mean the written document
which is generally issued to the licensee upon his fulfilling all the
requirements of the law relating to the licensed vehicle, business or
occupation. It is not essential to the authority or
privilege itself, and is issued principally as a matter of evidence.
Elmore v.
Overton, 104 Ind. 548, 555, 4 N. E. 197, 54 Am. Rep. 343;
Moore v. St.
Paul, 61 Minn. 427, 429, 63 N. W. 1087;
United States
v. Cutting, 70 U. S. (3 Wall.) 441, 443, 18 L. ed. 241;
Connecticut
Breweries Co. v. Murphy, 81 Conn. 145, 70 Atl. 450
A
license of an automobile for carrying persons for hire does not create
any contract between the city and the licensee, and the acceptance of
the same does not impose any obligation upon the licensee to follow the
business covered by the license.
Chicago v.
Gall (1915) 195 111. App. 41
“A
chauffeur, within the sense defined in Veh. Code §
71, is one who is paid compensation for his services.”
Hutton v.
California
Portland Cement Co. (1942) 50
CA2d. 684
"...
Section 1 [of the Motor Vehicle Act] excludes from the definition of
the term 'operator' everyone 'who solely transports by motor vehicle
... his or its own property, or employees, or both, and who transports
no persons or property for hire or compensation.'"
Bacon
Service
Corporation v. Huss (1926) 199
Cal. 21
Therefore
it becomes necessary at the outset of a consideration of
the problem herein presented to distinguish between a right which
arises as the result of a contractual obligation and a right acquired
by a license granted under the inherent police power of the state.
It
is conceded that every citizen has a right to follow any lawful
business or profession which is not injurious to the public or a menace
to the health, safety or welfare of society, free from regulation by
the exercise of the police power of the state except in cases of
necessity for such health, safety or welfare, and when its authority is
so interposed in behalf of the public it must be by means reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of that purpose.
A
license has
none of the elements of a contract and does not confer an absolute
right but a personal privilege to be exercised under existing
restrictions and such as may thereafter be reasonably imposed.
In
accordance with such general rule this court stated in the case of
Gregory v. Hecke, 73 Cal.App. 268 [238 P. 787]:
"No
person can acquire a vested right to continue, when once licensed, in a
business, trade or occupation which is subject to legislative control
under the police powers." (Citing Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516
[4 S.Ct. 111, 28 L.Ed. 232]. See 12 Am.Jur. § 694, p. 371; 16 C.J.S. §
224, p. 647.)
Rosenblatt v.
California
(1945) 69
Cal.App.2d 69
A
license proper is a permit to do business which could not be done
without the license.
CITY
AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO v. LIVERPOOL AND LONDON AND GLOBE INSURANCE
COMPANY et al. (1887) 74 Cal. 113
A
license in its proper sense is a permit to do business which could not
be done without the license.
CITY OF
SONORA v. J. B. CURTIN (1902) 137 Cal. 583
It
is held that a tax upon a common carriers by motor vehicles is based
upon a reasonable classification, and does not involve any
unconstitutional discrimination, although it
does not apply to private vehicles, or those used by the owner in his
own business, and not for hire.”
Desser v.
Wichita, (1915) 96 Kan. 820; Iowa Motor
Vehicle Asso. v. Railroad Comrs., 75 A.L.R. 22.
The
Garcia court quoted Lambert v. California (1957) 355 U.S. 225, 227 [78
S.Ct. 240, 242][involving registration for convicted felons] as
follows: “‘Many [registration] laws are akin to licensing statutes in
that they pertain to the regulation of
business activities.
People
v. Garcia (2001) 25 Cal.4th 744
Registration
laws are common and their range is wide. Cf. Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278
U.S. 63 ; United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 ; United States v.
Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22 . Many such laws are akin to licensing statutes
in that they pertain to the regulation of business activities.
Lambert v.
California (1957) 355 U.S. 225
"We
have said, and we reiterate, that a license is merely a privilege to do
business and is not a contract between the authority granting
it
and the grantee, nor is it a property right. See syllabus by the court,
No. 4, Prettyman Inc. v. Florida Real Estate Commission ex
rel.
Branham, 92 Fla. 515, 109 So. 442."
Mayo
et al. v. Market Fruit Co. of Sanford, Inc.
(1949) 40
So.2d 555
“A
license is in the general nature of a special privilege, entitling the
licensee to do something that he would not be entitled to do without
the license”.
51 Am. Jur.2d.,
LICENSES AND PERMITS, PART ONE, GENERAL
PRINCIPLES, I. GENERAL, §1. Generally, p. 7