A contract is an agreement to do or not to do a certain thing.



    19572.  Each of the following constitutes cause for discipline of an employee, or of a person whose name appears on any employment list:
           (a) Fraud in securing appointment.
           (b) Incompetency.
           (c) Inefficiency.                       
           (d) Inexcusable neglect of duty.
           (e) Insubordination.
           (f) Dishonesty.
           (g) Drunkenness on duty.
           (h) Intemperance.
           (i) Addiction to the use of controlled substances.
           (j) Inexcusable absence without leave.
           (k) Conviction of a felony or conviction of a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude. A plea or verdict of guilty, or a conviction following a plea of nolo contendere, to a charge of a felony or any offense involving moral turpitude is deemed to be a conviction within the meaning of this section.
           (l) Immorality.
           (m) Discourteous treatment of the public or other employees.
           (n) Improper political activity.
           (o) Willful disobedience.
           (p) Misuse of state property.
           (q) Violation of this part or of a board rule.
           (r) Violation of the prohibitions set forth in accordance with Section 19990.
           (s) Refusal to take and subscribe any oath or affirmation that is required by law in connection with the employment.
           (t) Other failure of good behavior either during or outside of duty hours, which is of such a nature that it causes discredit to the appointing authority or the person's employment.
           (u) Any negligence, recklessness, or intentional act that results in the death of a patient of a state hospital serving the mentally disabled or the developmentally disabled.
           (v) The use during duty hours, for training or target practice, of any material that is not authorized for that use by the appointing power.
           (w) Unlawful discrimination, including harassment, on any basis listed in subdivision (a) of Section 12940, as those bases are defined in Sections 12926 and 12926.1, except as otherwise provided in Section 12940, against the public or other employees while acting in the capacity of a state employee.
           (x) Unlawful retaliation against any other state officer or employee or member of the public who in good faith reports, discloses, divulges, or otherwise brings to the attention of, the Attorney General or any other appropriate authority, any facts or information relative to actual or suspected violation of any law of this state or the United States occurring on the job or directly related to the job.





Please don't pull us over officer.   We're just on vacation.

The rationale upon which the "reasonable suspicion " doctrine is based, a doctrine that thwarts the notion of liberty and freedom from state intrusion in a mobile society, must be founded on an objective basis for suspecting that a particular person is engaged in criminal activity, lest we "sweep many ordinary citizens into a generality of suspicious appearance merely on hunch." Rodriguez, 976 F.2d at 596.   Reasonable suspicion can not rest upon the hunch of an experienced officer, even if the hunch turns out right.
USA v JIMINEZ MEDINA (1999) No. 97-10055 U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals

...infractions are not crimes...

...the Legislature did not intend to classify infractions as crimes.
FN 1.  Battle soundly reasoned infractions are not crimes;...
People v. Sava (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 935

We conclude that, in the circumstances of this case, probable cause to believe that there had been a traffic infraction or non-criminal violation was insufficient to justify an impoundment of a vehicle parked in the owner’s driveway, in the absence of a valid caretaking purpose.
MIRANDA v. CITY OF CORNELIUS (2005)  No. 04-35940, 9th Cir. Court of Appeals
Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court.   In this case we decide whether the temporary detention of a motorist who the police have probable cause to believe has committed a civil traffic violation is inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable seizures unless a reasonable officer would have been motivated to stop the car by a desire to enforce the traffic laws.
WHREN et al. v. UNITED STATES (1996), 517 U.S. 806


            The prosecution, the accuser, has to prove with sufficient evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, the party they have accused of a crime has committed a crime.   In absence of sufficient evidence the accused can not be found guilty of committing a crime.   If you've gotten this far then you've seen evidcence establishing that the Legislateure never intended infractions to be crimes.  The Sava holding supports that as does the proud admission by the Judicial Council of their sponsoring the legislation creating the noncriminal traffic infraction in their 2001 Annual Report.

            Everybody knows if you get rid of the engine that whatever's behind the engine will not go anywhere.   I'd suggest applying that concept to what people call a "traffic stop" and how to deal with it if you believe Mr. Law Enforcement Officer got it wrong.   So first things first, what's the engine?   What in fact started the train you're on rollin down the tracks to the destination of  Empty Your Walletville?

The answer is sitting in that car.


Grocery shopping?!   Yeah right!   Gimme your license punk!

            Law enforcement employees are prohibited from breaking the laws they swore an oath to enforce.   They have both an employment contract and an oath that imposes a mandatory duty upon them not to deny or prejudice the secured rights of the people they serve.   They have both an employement contract and an oath that requires them to comply with the laws they enforce, when they don't they are liable in damages to the party who's rights were denied or prejudiced.   Stated another way, law enforcment officers don't get to be hypocrites and break the law.

            When you're subjected to a so-called "traffic stop" and issued a NOTICE TO APPEAR, you're being accused of INFIDENITY TO THE LAW.   It's a type of adultry if you will.   Your accuser is always a municipal government employee, either State or local, but they're an employee.    So your employee has accused you of infidelity.    The good news is that's true or false.    If it's true then you have a problem, if it's not then your employee has a problem.   Obviously you're gonna put your money on the bet that the employee is wrong.    But this isn't gambling.   There's rules that the employess agreed to follow.   When they don't comply they're in breach.   Dicipline is provided when the employees deviate from the rules and regulations that apply to them.

            This is precisely what a so-called "traffic stop" is, it's a DICIPLINARY ACTION based on the employee's evaluation of your conduct.   It's just that simple.   Had the employee presumed his or her evaluation of your conduct not being in violation of the law, then he or she would not have activated the patrol vehicle's red lights and caused you to stop.    Ipso facto, the red lights are evidence the employee presumed you were in violation of a law.   That presumption is rebuttable or conclusive.

            If it were me, and I was accused of an infraction, I'd set about rebutting the presumption because it's the rebuttable type, not the conclusive type.    What that means is READING THE RULES to determine HOW TO!


            Hey folks, that's what the so-called traffic stop" boils down to.   That's what the cops believe, the judges, commissioners, and pro tems, and attorneys and paralegals believe, as well as the vast majority of everyone else.  

            But you know what?   It's bullshit.   It's a bluff.   It's a pump fake.   It's a head fake.  It's simply FAKE!   When people put this puzzle together, they're gonna be a little upset because they'll have figured out they've been played like a grand piano by more than a few of their employees, FOR THEIR ENTIRE LIFE.    

            They, the employees on THE PEOPLE'S GOVERNMENT PAYROLL, don't want the People, their EMPLOYER, to know that the entire so-called "traffic stop" system is based on fraud.   What people believe is a "traffic stop" is a warrantless arrest.   If you didn't know that then you've been mislead by everyone who's ever called it that because that's not what it is.   It's an ARREST.  Period!   That's how it's defined in the Vehicle Code itself.  

            There's rules provided by the Legislature that apply to law enforcment officers who choose to enforce the Vehicle Code.   That's correct, every so-called "traffic stop" is an arrest and when it's made without a warrant it's a "warrantless arrest", not a "traffic stop".   The term "traffic stop" is slang.   That term is not utilized nor defined in the Vehicle Code because that's not what it's called.   It's an ARREST.   The government employee better pray to his or her God that they correctly interpreted what they observed because if what they observed was not a crime, they lose their qualified immunity from a suit for damages for denial and prejudice of the very rights they applied for the job to protect and the oath they swore that they would.   Denying the rights they swore not to deny is not protecting them so they violate the terms of their employment contract and oath of office.   Golly.

            By the way, when you actually read the rule that applies to law enforcement employees who make arrests without a warrant, you'll see they ARE NOT REQUIRED to arrest anyone without a warrant.   California Penal Code section 836(a)(1).

            Given it's an arrest it kinda sets out what the defense might be.    But I doubt the majority of people know they've been arrested when stopped and issued a NOTICE TO APPEAR for some alleged infraction of the Vehicle Code, so they probably wouldn't make an "arrest" argument instead going with something else tried and true like "I wasn't goin that fast your honor".   People who'd make that assertion have no awareness they just ADMITTED THEY WERE SPEEDING.  

            The funny thing is, an infraction isn't even a crime and no one seems to mind, but if it's not a crime, and the accuser's burden of proof is proof beyond a reasonable doubt of crime, how can you possibly lose?   Ask anyone if they want to beat a ticket and you won't have to listen too closely to hear their answer, and it's always the same.   Unless they're a moron.  

            The good news is there's RULES FOR ARRESTS that apply to government employees.  You've seen a pretty important one just a bit ago.   The even more good news is the rules for arrests that apply to police, highway patrol, and Sheriff deputies when making one for an alleged violation of the Vehicle Code, are conveniently located in the Vehicle Code itself.  

            Our Legislators worked almost tirelessly to stick some rules for the cops right in the book they enforce so they didn't have to look around for em.   Wasn't that nice?!  







California Code of Judicial Ethics



B. Adjudicative Responsibilities

(4)   A judge shall be patient, dignified, and courteous to litigants, jurors, witnesses, lawyers, and others with whom the judge deals in an official capacity, and shall require* similar conduct of lawyers and of all court staff and personnel* under the judge's direction and control.

(5)   A judge shall perform judicial duties without bias or prejudice. A judge shall not, in the performance of judicial duties, engage in speech, gestures, or other conduct that would reasonably be perceived as (1) bias or prejudice, including but not limited to bias or prejudice based upon race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation, or socioeconomic status, or (2) sexual harassment.

Whatever he's getting paid it's far too much.  The only thing he should be getting paid for is making license plates.

They really can be quite likeable once you get to know them.

Even if the officer is not expected to know the law of all 50 states, surely he is expected to know the California Vehicle Code...

Even if the officer is not expected to know the law of all 50 states, surely he is expected to know the California Vehicle Code,...



Article 1.  Arrests .......................................... 40300 - 40313

40300.  The provisions of this chapter shall govern all peace officers in making arrests for violations of this code without a warrant for offenses committed in their presence,...*

40500.  (a) Whenever a person is arrested for any violation of this code not declared to be a felony, or for a violation of an ordinance of a city or county relating to traffic offenses and he is not immediately taken before a magistrate, as provided in this chapter, the arresting officer shall prepare in triplicate a written notice to appear in court or before a person authorized to receive a deposit of bail, containing the name and address of the person, the license number of his or her vehicle, if any, the name and address, when available, of the registered owner or lessee of the vehicle, the offense charged and the time and place when and where he shall appear.  If the arrestee does not have a driver's license or other satisfactory evidence of identity in his or her possession, the officer may require the arrestee...

40504.  (a) The officer shall deliver one copy of the notice to appear to the arrested person and the arrested person in order to secure release must give his or her written promise to appear in court...  Thereupon, the arresting officer shall forthwith release the person arrested from custody.

            That's right, it's not a "traffic stop" which everyone is scared shitless of, no, it's even worse, it's a CUSTODIAL ARREST.   There's your proof right there provided by your legislative employees.   They wrote that and they meant what they wrote.   Feel like a dumb ass?   Keep calling things what they aren't.   Keep using the wrong definitions and you'll continue to be a success at failing.   Why isn't that information taught to the kids?   Everybody knows full well they're gonna want to use a car but why do parents and teachers tolerate children not being taught the rules they KNOW exist?  WHY WASN'T THIS TAUGHT TO YOU?   Ashton Kutcher needs to revitalize PUNK'D and focus on the driver license and "traffic stop" scam?

            In fact it's even worse than people realize!   Take a look at what these courts determined and held:

“...the display of emergency lights effected a detention...”
People v. Bailey (1985) 176 Cal. App. 3d 402

We conclude Brown was detained when the emergency lights were activated.

“We see little difference, from the perspective of the occupants in the vehicle,[between] turning on the blue lights behind a moving vehicle and turning on the blue lights behind a parked vehicle.   The lights still convey the message that the occupants are not free to leave.”

Brown was detained when Geasland stopped behind the parked car and turned on his emergency lights.

“[W]here a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity exists, ‘the public rightfully expects a police officer to inquire into such circumstances “in the proper exercise of the officer's duties.”’” (People v. Wells (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1078, 1083 [45 Cal. Rptr. 3d 8, 136 P.3d810] (Wells), quoting In re Tony C. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 888, 894 [148 Cal.Rptr. 366, 582 P.2d 957].)

But for the use of the emergency lights, the encounter would have been consensual.
People v. Brown (2015) 61 Cal. 4th 968, Supreme Court of California
[Kamala Harris was the AG at the time!]

Even where police officers stop a moving vehicle for a brief detention, it is sufficient to constitute an arrest.
5 Amer. Jurisprudence, 2d, "Arrest," sect. 1, p. 296.

The Vehicle Code however, refers to the person awaiting citation as "the arrested person."
People v. Hubbard (1970) 9 Cal.App.3d 827

Vehicle Code section 40504, subdivision (a), commands that when a traffic offender such as defendant herein gives his written promise to appear by signing two copies of the citation, "Thereupon the arresting officer shall forthwith release
the person arrested from custody."

People v. McGaughran
(1979), 25 Cal.3d 577
[Crim. No. 20293. Supreme Court of California. October 25, 1979.]


    835.  An arrest is made by an actual restraint of the person, or by submission to the custody of an officer..



            Have your eyes deceived you?   Or have government employees and other adults deceived you?   When the emergency light are activated you're UNDER ARREST!  YOU'VE ALREADY BEEN DETAINED = ARREST!

                Everyone wants a car but they sure don't want to know how to maintain or fix it nor the rules that apply to its use while at the same time wanting to know "how to beat a ticket".   Real responsible.  

           All section 40300 informs the officer of is that;   THESE ARE THE RULES TO FOLLOW WHEN YOU MAKE AN ARREST WITHOUT A WARRANT, but it doesn't tell him he gets to make one.   Presumptively the rule PERMITTING the arrest is within these sections.   Regardless of where it is, IT BETTER EXIST! 


Did Officer Underling acquire that property for his boss legally?  Did he have or was he responding to a warrant?


Capt. Dearest


...as appellant correctly points out, ratification occurs only by a principal, not by an agent. (See Civ. Code, 2310; see also Alvarado Community Hospital v. Superior Court (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 476, 481 [219 Cal.Rptr. 52], affirming "the well-settled rule of agency that a principal will be held to have ratified the agent's actions where he voluntarily accepts the benefits of the unauthorized transaction.")
Murphy v. Padilla (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 707


            If you made it this far you're aware the so-called "traffic stop" is an arrest.   That's how the State Legislature chose to identify what everyone calls a "traffic stop".   I'd put it this way, it's a warrantless arrest for an alleged violation of a rule that applies to commercial conduct.   So if you're involved in commerce maybe the State will win its case.   But they're gonna have to prove you were with "sufficient evidence".   

            The good news is that there's rules that apply to your accuser and the prosecutor!   If you know what they are you'll be able to do to them what they're attempting to do to you, seek retribution for their lawless behavior.   No one likes losing, that's why rules are written.   All the rules that apply to law enforcement employees, all the attorneys at the DA's office, the employee wearing the black dress pretending to be fair and impartial, there's rules that apply to all of them.   Know what?   They know the rules that apply to you better than you know the rules that apply to them.   It's 3 against 1 and you're paying them because they're your employees.   Real fair eh?   Do you realize you pick up the tab for being prosecuted.   You finance the case against you tax payer dude or dudette.   You pay the cop.   You pay the judicial officer.   You pay the court clerk.   You have to use your gas to get there.   Real fair eh?   And this before you even have your day in court.   Add to all that insult that you're the employer being ganged up on by your employees.  

            REMEMBER:    You're innocent until your accuser proves, with sufficient evidence, that you're not.  

    So let's get down to brass tacks.   The following are unassailable facts:  
            That's a lot of facts, and there's even more.   You can deny them if you want because you have freedom of choice, so if you choose not to accept them and build your case on other issues, fine.   They like it when people have to pay them and the easier you make it for them the better.  

            How could your adversary prove you were driving when the Legislature's never defined the term?   Sure there's plenty of definitions from the court and every other place, but not THE PLACE that actually counts, the LAW MAKING BODY OF GOVERNMENT, THE PEOPLE YOU HIRE.

Shit!  Dunkin Doughnuts is closed.

            Again, the good news is there's rules that apply to your law enforcement employees to which they must comply.   THANKFULLY!  

            They agreed to follow them when they applied for the job.   After they got the job they then swore a mandatory oath of office not to disparage or deny your clearly established constitutionally secured rights, any of them.  

            So there's two things that constitute the People's leverage over their law enforcement employees, their EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT and their OATH OF OFFICE.   Oh, and they have a bond.


            That means you can sue them.   Typically you can't because they have "qualified immunity" from suit while on the clock.   Stated another way, while they're on the job.   This is where the rules come in.  


12801.5.  (e) Notwithstanding Section 40300 or any other provision of law, a peace officer may not detain or arrest a person solely on the belief that the person is an unlicensed driver, unless the officer has reasonable cause to believe the person driving is under the age of 16 years.
14607.6.   (b) A peace officer shall not stop a vehicle for the sole reason of determining whether the driver is properly licensed.

            AS LONG AS they follow the rules when you were damaged by them, you can't sue.   HOWEVER, when they act without authorization or contrary to the rules that apply to them they swore an oath to follow, make hay while the sun shines cuz they have no immunity!   In fact YOU have immunity too!   IT IS A CRIME TO ARREST SOMEONE WITHOUT A WARRANT FOR NONCRIMINAL BEHAVIOR.   THE PEOPLE ARE IMMUNE FROM ARREST WHEN ENGAGED IN NONCRIMINAL CONDUCT.   YOU ARE IMMUNE FROM ARREST AND CRIMINAL PROSECUTION FOR ENGAGING IN NONCRIMINAL CONDUCT.   You CAN NOT be arrested LEGALLY/VALIDLY without a warrant unless you've committed a crime.

"Common as the event may be, it is a serious thing to arrest a citizen, and it is a more serious thing to search his person; and he who accomplishes it, must do so in conformity to the law of the land.   There are two reasons for this; one to avoid bloodshed, and the other to preserve the liberty of the citizen.   Obedience to the law is the bond of society, and the officers set to enforce the law are not exempt from its mandates.".
Town of Blacksburg v. Bean (1916) 104 S.C. 146, 88 S.E. 441
Allen v. State (1924) 197 N.W. 808, 810-11 (Wis.)

[2, 3] "... Substantial circumstances [are required] to justify the detention and questioning of persons ..." (People v. Moore, 69 Cal.2d 674, 683 [72 Cal.Rptr. 800, 446 P.2d 800]). "[T]he police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which ... reasonably warrant that intrusion." (Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 [20 L.Ed.2d 889, 906, 88 S.Ct. 1868].) "'There must be a "rational" suspicion by the peace officer that some activity out of the ordinary is or has taken place ... some indication to connect the person under suspicion with the unusual activity ... [and] some suggestion that the activity is related to crime.' [Citation.] Where the events are as consistent with innocent activity as with criminal activity, a detention based on those events is unlawful." (Irwin v. Superior Court, supra, 1 Cal.3d 423, 427.)
Barber v. Superior Court (1973) 30 Cal.App.3d 326
[Civ. No. 12528. Court of Appeals of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division One. January 30, 1973.

[1] Thus, a detention based on "mere hunch" is unlawful (People v. Nailor, 240 Cal.App.2d 489, 493 [49 Cal.Rptr. 616]), even though the officer may have acted in good faith (Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392 U.S. 1, 22 [20 L.Ed.2d 889, 906]). There must be a "rational" suspicion by the peace officer that some activity out of the ordinary is or has taken place ... some indication to connect the person under suspicion with the unusual activity... [and] some suggestion that the activity is related to crime." (People v. Henze, 253 Cal.App.2d 986, 988 [61 Cal.Rptr. 545].) [2] Where the events are as consistent with innocent activity as with criminal activity, a detention based on those events is unlawful. (People v. Moore, supra, 69 Cal.2d 674, 683; People v. One 1960 Cadillac Coupe, supra, 62 Cal.2d 92, 96; People v. Escollias, 264 Cal.App.2d 16, 19-20 [70 Cal.Rptr. 65]; People v. Hunt, 250 Cal.App.2d 311, 314 [58 Cal.Rptr. 385].)
Irwin v. Superior Court (1969) 1 Cal.3d 423
[L. A. No. 29665. In Bank. Dec. 17, 1969.]

The vice of this sort of legislation is quite aptly pointed out in the case of United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 [23 L. Ed. 563, see, also, Rose's U. S. Notes], in which the court says: "If the legislature undertakes to define a new offense and provide for its punishment, it should express its will in language that need not deceive the common mind:  Every man should be able to know with certainty when he is committing a crime. . . . It would certainly be dangerous if the legislature could set a net large enough to catch all possible offenders and leave it to the courts to step inside and see who could be rightfully detained and who should be set at large."
In re Peppers (1922) 189 Cal. 682

Every man should be able to know with certainty when he is committing a crime. (In re Peppers, 189 Cal. 682, 686 [209 P.896].)
Agnew v. City of Culver City (1956) 147 Cal.App.2d 144

Even if the officer is not expected to know the law of all 50 states, surely he is expected to know the California Vehicle Code...

Even if the officer is not expected to know the law of all 50 states, surely he is expected to know the California Vehicle Code,...

            How could a law enforcement officer be competent if they don't know that infractions are not crimes?   If the officer doesn't know then he exposes the municipality to suit for damages as well as himself.

     "...infractions are not crimes...  ...the Legislature did not intend to classify infractions as crimes."    
FN 1.  Battle soundly reasoned infractions are not crimes;...
People v. Sava (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 935


            With what law is that officer in...

To legally arrest and detain, the Government must assert probable cause to believe the arrestee has committed a crime.
Serna v. Superior Court (1985) 40 Cal.3d 239

When the seizure of a person amounts to an arrest, it must be supported by an arrest warrant or by probable cause. (Kaupp v. Texas, supra,  538 U.S. at p. 630.)  Probable cause exists when the facts known to the arresting officer would persuade someone of "reasonable caution" that the person to be arrested has committed a crime. (Dunaway v. New York (1979) 442 U.S. 200, 208, fn. 9.)
People v. Celis (2004) 33 Cal.4th 667

By its definition, probable cause can only exist in relation to criminal conduct.  
The Ninth Circuit, as well as the Seventh and Eighth Circuits, have recognized that probable cause can only exist in relation to criminal conduct. 
Allen v. City of Portland (1995) 73 F.3d 232 (9th Cir.)

[6b] The judiciary has a solemn obligation to insure that the constitutional right of an accused to a fair trial is realized. If that right would be thwarted by enforcement of a statute, the statute, as in Chambers v. Mississippi, supra, 410 U.S. 284, and Washington v. Texas, supra, 388 U.S. 14, must yield.
Hammarley v. Superior Court (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 38




...Hanson violated Stevens' right not to be arrested in the absence of probable cause to believe Stevens had committed a crime, and that right was clearly established and would be known to a reasonable officer in the circumstances.
Stevens v. Rose (2002) 298 F.3d 880, 9th Cir.

An answer, a demurrer, and a motion to strike constitute a general appearance (Code Civ. Proc., 1014), since a court does not decide questions raised by such pleadings at the behest of persons over whom it has no jurisdiction.   A court need not have jurisdiction over the person, however, to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.   Indeed, the court must dismiss on that ground on its own motion. (Morris v. Gilmer, 129 U.S. 315, 326-327 [9 S.Ct. 289, 32 L.Ed. 690]; Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal, 17 Cal.2d 280, 302-303 [109 P.2d 942, 132 A.L.R. 715].)   Thus, a challenge to the subject-matter jurisdiction of the court is not inconsistent with a challenge to personal jurisdiction.   Moreover, since the court must dismiss on its own motion, an appropriate challenge to subject-matter jurisdiction aids the court in performing its duty.   The defendant should therefore be allowed to point out lack of subject-matter jurisdiction without making a general appearance.
Goodwine v. Superior Court (1965) 63 Cal.2d 481

...the state must not profit from its own wrong. (Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 64-65 [74 S.Ct. 354, 98 L.Ed. 503, 506-507]; McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 [69 S.Ct. 191, 93 L.Ed. 153, 158-159]; People v. Martin, 45 Cal.2d 755, 760 [290 P.2d 855].)
People v. Parham (1963) 60 Cal.2d 378
It has long been the law of California "that evidence obtained by such unconstitutional means [illegal arrests, searches, and seizures] is inadmissible at the trial [citations] and incompetent to support an accusatory pleading [citation]." (People v. Valenti (1957) 49 Cal.2d 199, 203.)
People v. Sherwin (2000) No. C030485. Cal.App.4th

There is a constitutional right to be free from criminal prosecution based upon evidence that was illegally obtained by the government.
Devereaux v. Abbey (2001) 263 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir., en banc)

            Even the threat to violate a constitutional amendment taints the officer’s conduct, so having this knowledge provides us with ammo re defending our secured rights.

The principle that animates these cases is simple: a search is unreasonable — and so violates the Fourth Amendment — if its justification is grounded in officers “engaging or threatening to engage in conduct that violates the Fourth Amendment.” Kentucky v. King, 131 S.Ct. 1849, 1858 (2011).
UNITED STATES of America v. Dawud Ali SAAFIR (June 11, 2014) No. 13–4049, United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.    
(c) The proper test follows from the principle that permits warrantless searches: warrantless searches are allowed when the circumstances make it reasonable, within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, to dispense with the warrant requirement.   Thus, a warrantless entry based on exigent circumstances is reasonable when the police did not create the exigency by engaging or threatening to engage in conduct violating the Fourth Amendment.
Because the officers in this case did not violate or threaten to violate the Fourth Amendment prior to the exigency, we hold that the exigency justified the warrantless search of the apartment.        
KENTUCKY v. KING (2011) No. 09-1272, U.S. Supreme Court

            Your municipal employees have NO AUTHORITY TO EVEN THREATEN YOU with the denial or prejudice of your clearly established constitutionally secured rights.  



            Outside the SCOPE means the officer is acting contrary to the law he swore to comply with and is liable in damages to the party he damaged.

            As you saw on the drive page, speeding isn't a crime, it's negligence.   In fact that's what civil juries are instructed by the judge in speeding cases because it's a civil jury instruction.   When it comes to negligence it's UNintentional.   Uh, if there's no intent then the prosecution is gonna have one helluva time carrying their burden because they HAVE TO prove intent.   Can you say The Hillary Defense?   PUHLEEEZE TELL ME YOU CAN!  

            By the way, if you want some absolutely killer law lessons about criminal law then watch the FBI director's hearing conducted by the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee, where Mr. Comey splained why after a year they just couldn't seem to locate the INTENT for recommending a criminal prosecution.   Actually, all they had to do was look in the basement of her house to see the intent, computers don't walk, they're carried.   You paid for it so you might as well get something useful out of it.  

            "Examination of the witness"  aptly and deftly demonstrated by the brilliant questions posed by many of the Repukes.  No, I'm a NO PARTY member.   If you've watched as many Congressional and Senate hearings as I have you'd probably have the same take on those posers.   You don't know what bullshit is until you've watched one.   When you do wear galoshes because the stuff is deep and flowy.   

            The FBI director is a former US Attorney.   By the way, both he and AG Lynch worked the same jurisdiction in NY, isn't that nice?   In any event he probably knows a thing or two about crime and criminal law so it may be worth checkin out.   You can skip the Demowanks cuz all they care about is party politics and covering up for that lyin duplicitous adulterer enabler who should be sitting in jail as you read this but isn't.   If you've ever paid a parking ticket or other Vehicle Code ticket, you've paid more that that skank ass swine.   


You had to pay a parking ticket and nuthin happened to me for lying and cheating and stealing and getting people killed and breaking my word and breaching my employment contract and violating my oath of office all the while being paid by you chump!   AND I WAS YOUR EMPLOYEE THE WHOLE TIME I WAS DOIN IT!   Hey, sucker, can you say GOLDEN PARACHUTE?  

            Man, one has to wonder how much more evidence the American people need to see before they're convinced Queen Swine is as guilty as her husband is a philanderer.      

             Enough about that lyin hag.   Let's get back to you and your rights.



Vol. 25,  June 1973

Nonarrest Automobile Stops:  Unconstitutional Seizures of the Person
B. Individual Interests

        The state interests in investigative and inspection stops must be balanced against the individual interests at stake in an automobile stop. Analysis of fourth amendment case law suggests that automobile stops may impinge on at least five of an individual's seizure-related fourth amendment interests.

I. Freedom from arbitrary state interference.

        A motorist has a fourth amendment interest in being free from arbitrary state interferences," as do nonmotorists.   Ordinarily this protection is afforded by requiring that an "objective evidentiary justification""' single out an individual for seizure."   However, in some circumstances protection from arbitrary interference may be afforded if an officer who can demonstrate that his action is legally authorized seizes members of a class on a regularized basis."'   A motorist's interest in freedom from arbitrary state interferences will be violated when he is seized in circumstances which provide neither of these guarantees against abuse of policemen's seizure powers.

2. "Autonomous self-positioning."

        An automobile stop impinges upon an individual's interest in making autonomous decisions to remain where he is or to go elsewhere."   Terry held that whenever an individual has been deprived of this autonomy he has been seized."   Obviously, this interest is as strong for a stationary individual as for the occupant of a moving car.

3. Free Passage.

        A moving individual has a further interest in liberty of movement which a stationary individual does not have-the interest in being able to continue his movement.   The Supreme Court recognized this interest in "free passage without interruption" in Carroll v. United States."   Carroll arose in the context of the stopping of an automobile to allow a search,"' but it has also been cited by the Court in discussing stops to allow seizures."'
        Clearly any moving individual has an interest in free passage, but a motorist's interest is especially strong.   First, an individual utilizes a car specifically to enhance his personal mobility.   In addition, while anyone can interrupt the movement of a slowly moving individual-for example, a pedestrian - ordinarily only a policeman can stop a motorist."'   Thus, as a practical matter, the occupant of a moving car has greater expectations of achieving free passage. These expectations have constitutional significance because fourth amendment jurisprudence holds that reasonable expectations of freedom from government interference play a role in the delineation of fourth amendment rights.

4. "Autonomous other-encountering."

        Automobile stops also impinge upon an individual's interest in avoiding those whom he does not wish to encounter."   Although closely related to and often realized by exercise of autonomous self-positioning, this interest has distinct content.   The distinction is obscured by the fact that a policeman can ordinarily encounter a motorist only by interfering with his autonomous self-positioning and freedom of passage.   The distinct content of this interest may be seen, however, in the fact that a policeman can encounter a stationary individual without interfering with his autonomous self-positioning."   The interest in autonomous other-encountering exists for both stationary and moving individuals, but it is especially strong for a motorist because he can almost entirely avoid undesired encounters with individuals other than policemen.

5. Privacy rights.

        Finally, the occupant of a moving automobile has special fourth amendment privacy interests which stem from the operation of fourth amendment search law.   Case law holds that plain sight observations by policemen are not searches,"' and that a policeman who is justifiably in a position to observe incriminating evidence in plain sight" may arrest on that basis."   Thus a policeman who lawfully" approaches a vehicle may arrest its occupant if he observes illegal activity or illegal objects in plain sight."   On the other hand, search law governs a policeman in searching for objects not visible from outside the car.
        The interaction of these doctrines gives a motorist greater privacy expectations than either a pedestrian or an occupant of a stationary car has.   First, a pedestrian has neither the degree of personal privacy afforded by an automobile's design"' or a vehicle occupant's opportunity to conceal objects.   The motion of a moving car further gives a motorist greater privacy than the occupant of a stationary car has.   An automobile is only partially enclosed and therefore only partially private; anyone may easily approach and look into a stationary vehicle.   A moving car, on the other hand, though not a shield from all intrusions, is difficult to approach, and it is therefore difficult to observe its contents.   The combined factors of a vehicle's enclosed nature and its movement thus afford the occupant of a moving car greater expectations of privacy than either a pedestrian or an occupant of a stationary vehicle has.


Right of Privacy
Property Rights
Right to Travel
237.  Right of Privacy

        The state constitution provides that all persons have the right to pursue and obtain privacy(14).
        The California constitutional guarantees is motivated by concern over contemporary society’s accelerating encroachment on personal freedom and security caused by increased surveillance and data collection(18).  It exists to prevent governmental snooping, to inhibit the overly broad collection and retention of unnecessary personal information(17)...
        Ibid. p. 527       
        ...the right of privacy had been recognized as a fundamental right in this state.
        ...right of privacy guaranteed by the state constitution is much broader than the privacy guaranteed by the federal Constitution(23).
        ...it is the right of a person to lead his or her private life without intrusion the government.

238.  Right to Travel

        The nature of the federal union and of constitutional concepts of personal liberty unite to require that all citizens be free to travel throughout the length and breadth of the United States uninhibited by statutes, rules, or regulations that unreasonably burden or restrict this movement(42).
        And the constitutional right to travel between the states implies a correlative constitutional right to travel within a state(46).
        Ibid. p. 538

239.   Property Rights

        This constitutional provision refers to the right to acquire and possess the absolute and unqualified title to every species of property recognized by law, with all rights incidental thereto(55).
        Ibid. p. 540
        The right of protecting property is not the simple right to protection by individual physical force, but is the right to protect property by the law of the land and the force of the body politic(57).
        Both state(58) and federal(59) constitutions prohibit the state from depriving a person of property without due process of law(60).
        Thus, before a person may be deprived of any significant interest, he or she must be afforded notice and an opportunity for a hearing(62).
        Ibid. pgs. 541 - 542

B. LIBERTY [243 - 245]


        The right to liberty consists of the right to be free from arbitrary personal restraint as well as the right to do such acts as a person may judge best for his interests, and the right of a person to be free in the enjoyment of all his faculties (243).
Ibid. p. 552

243.  In general

        Personal liberty is a fundamental interest, second only to life itself, protected under both the California and the United States Constitutions(17).  The term “liberty” as used in the state and federal constitutions(18) consists partially of the right to be free from arbitrary personal restraint(19).  For example, the right of a citizen to drive on a public street with freedom from police interference, unless he or she is engaged in suspicious conduct associate in some manner with criminality, is a fundamental constitutional right(20).

[2] The people of the State of California are supreme and have the undoubted right to protect themselves and to preserve the form of government...
Steiner v. Darby (1948) 88 Cal.App.2d 481

Persons dealing with a public agency are presumed to know the law and are bound at their peril to ascertain and follow those procedures necessary to enter into a binding contract. (See Miller v. McKinnon, supra, 20 Cal.2d at p. 89; Bear River etc. Corp. v. County of Placer (1953) 118 Cal.App.2d 684 , 690 [258 P.2d 543].)
[Civ. No. 22606. Court of Appeals of California, Third Appellate District. March 9, 1984.]

"Everyone is presumed to know the law.   And all applicable laws in existence when an agreement is made necessarily enter into it and form a part of it as fully as if they were expressly referred to and incorporated in its terms." (6 Cal.Jur. 310, 186; Brown v. Ferdon, 5 Cal.2d 226  [54 P.2d 712]; Chapman v. Jocelyn, 182 Cal. 294 [187 P. 962]; Long v. Newman, 10 Cal.App. 430 [102 P. 534].)

The contracting parties were, therefore, presumed to know all existing laws...
Robertson v. Dodson, 54 Cal.App.2d 661
[Civ. No. 12069. First Dist., Div. One. Oct. 2, 1942.]

We thus require citizens to apprise themselves not only of statutory language but also of legislative history, subsequent judicial construction, and underlying legislative purposes (People v. Grubb (1965) 63 Cal.2d 614, 620 [47 Cal.Rptr. 772, 408 P.2d 100]). (See generally Amsterdam, The Void-For-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court (1960) 109 U. Pa. L.Rev. 67.)
Walker v. Superior Court (1988) 47 Cal.3d 112

        1708.  Every person is bound, without contract, to abstain from injuring the person or property of another, or infringing upon any of his or her rights.

As is the case of illegal arrests, the officer is bound to know these fundamental rights and  privileges, and must keep within the law at his peril.
Thiede v. Town Of Scandia Valley, 217 Minn. 218. 231 (1944)

“...one who interferes with another's liberty does so at his peril”.
Knight v. Baker, 117 Ore. 492, 244 Pac. 543, 544 (1926).
"One who interferes with another's  liberty does so at his peril."
University of  Pennsylvania Law Review, vol. 75, p. 491,  April 1927.
One who interferes with another’s liberty does so at his peril.
McBeath v. Campbell, 12 S.W.2d 118, 122 (1929)

When the  plaintiff has shown that he was arrested, imprisoned or restrained of his liberty  by the defendant,  "the law presumes it to be unlawful."
People v. McGrew (1888) 77 Cal. 570



We the people of California, grateful to Almighty; God for our freedom: in order to secure its blessings, do establish this Constitution.

Article I:  Declaration of Rights

Sec. 1.

        All men are by nature free and independent, and have certain unalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty: acquiring, possessing and protecting property: and pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness.

Sec. 6.

        Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor shall cruel or unusual punishments be inflicted, nor shall witnesses be unreasonably detained.
Sec. 8.

        No person shall be subject to be twice put in jeopardy for the same offence; nor shall he be compelled, in any criminal case, to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation.

Sec. 10.

        The people shall have the right freely to assemble together, to consult for the common good, to instruct their representatives, and to petition the legislature for redress of grievances.

Sec. 19.

        The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable seizures and searches, shall not be violated;

Sec. 21.

        This enumeration of rights shall not be construed to impair or deny others, retained by the people.

Summary of California Law, vol 7, Constitutional Law, p. 9

B.  Constitution of California

    2.  ['51]  Restrictive and Enabling Provisions

        (a) Restrictions on State Powers.  The California Constitution, like other state constitutions, is generally a restriction upon the powers of the state.

...the state Constitution, as distinguished from the federal Constitution, does not constitute a grant of power, or an enabling act, to the legislature, but rather constitutes a limitation upon the powers of that body....we do not look to the Constitution to determine whether the legislature is authorized to do an act, but only to see if it is prohibited.  In other words, unless restrained by constitutional provision, the legislature is vested with the whole of the legislative power of the state. (Macmillan Co. v. Clarke, 184 Cal. 491 [194 P. 1030, 17 A.L.R. 288]; Mitchell v. Winnek, 117 Cal. 520, 525 [49 P. 579]; Jensen v. McCullough, 94 Cal.App. 382, 394 [271 P. 568]; People v. Rinner, 52 Cal.App. 747, 749 [199 P. 1066].)
Fitts v. Superior Court, 6 Cal.2d 230
[L. A. No. 15256. In Bank. April 30, 1936.]

...the fact that our Constitution is not a grant of power but rather a limitation or restriction upon the powers of the Legislature (In re Madera Irr. Dist., 92 Cal. 296 [28 P. 272, 675, 29 Am.St.Rep. 106, 14 L.R.A. 755]; Macmillan Co. v. Clarke, 184 Cal. 491 [194 P. 1030, 17 A.L.R. 288]; People ex rel. Smith v. Judge of the Twelfth District, 17 Cal. 547; Sheehan v. Scott, 145 Cal. 684 [79 P. 350]; Fitts v. Superior Court, 6 Cal.2d 230 [57 P.2d 510]; Mitchell v. Winnek, 117 Cal. 520 [49 P. 579]) and "that we do not look to the Constitution to determine whether the Legislature is authorized to do an act, but only to see if it is prohibited." (Fitts v. Superior Court, supra.)
Collins v. Riley, 24 Cal.2d 912
[S. F. No. 17019. In Bank. Oct. 2, 1944.]
4.  No action or proceeding commenced before this code takes effect, and no right accrued, is affected by this code,...

    Pending Proceeding and Accrued Rights
4.    No action or proceeding commenced before this code takes effect, and no right accrued, is affected by the provisions of this code,...   
6.  No action or proceeding commenced before this Code takes effect, and no right accrued, is affected by its provisions.


100.      (a) The sovereignty of the state resides in the people thereof, and all writs and processes shall issue in their name.
              (b) The style of all process shall be "The People of the State of California," and all prosecutions shall be conducted in their name and by their authority.

6250.  In enacting this chapter, the Legislature, mindful of the right of individuals to privacy, finds and declares that access to information concerning the conduct of the people's business is a fundamental and necessary right of every person in this state.

11120.   It is the public policy of this state that public agencies exist to aid in the conduct of the people's business and the proceedings of public agencies be conducted openly so that the public may remain informed.

In enacting this article the Legislature finds and declares that it is the intent of the law that actions of state agencies be taken openly and that their deliberation be conducted openly.

The people of this state do not yield their sovereignty to the agencies which serve them. The people, in delegating authority, do not give their public servants the right to decide what is good for the people to know and what is not good for them to know. The people insist on remaining informed so that they may retain control over the instruments they have created.

This article shall be known and may be cited as the Bagley-Keene Open Meeting Act.

54950 DECLARATION OF LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE.   "In enacting this chapter, the Legislature finds and declares that the public commissions, boards and councils and the other public agencies in this State exist to aid in the conduct of the people's business.  It is the intent of the law that their actions be taken openly and that their deliberations be conducted openly.
The people of this State do not yield their sovereignty to the agencies which serve them. The people, in delegating authority, do not give their public servants the right to decide what is good for the people to know and what is not good for them to know.  The people insist on remaining informed so that they may retain control over the instruments they have created".